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Abstract.
This research project examines the relevance of Kenneth Arrow's (1951) Impossibility
Theorem as a criterion for assessing post-modem critical approaches to development media
theories (Servaes, 200 I; Melkote and Steeves, 2000). Comparing two distinct indigenous
minorities' experiences with struggles for cultural autonomy, those of Norway's Sami and
Botswana's Basarwa, it was found that the media discourses used by NGOs frequently
exploit a narrative that validly permits development to be treated as a species of social
welfare implementation. Applying Arrow's (1951) conditions for the democratic summation
of diverse preferences, and treating cultural, political, and civil society groups as 'voters', it
was found that indigenous minority concerns may be best accommodated by linking them to
broader issues that exploit historical ties between peoples, with a special emphasis on
episodes that have led to coordination in achieving independent ends. Popular memories of
such coordination appear to moderate relations between minorities and their national co-






















Official name for several indigenous San groups in Botswana.
Central Kalahari Game Reserve, Botswana.
Botswana Centre for Human Rights.
Euskadi ta Askatasuna - a terrorist organization organized in 1959 by student
activists who were dissatisfied with the moderate nationalism of the traditional
Basque party; want to create on independent homeland in Spain's western
Pyrenees.
First People of Kalahari also called "Kgeikani Kweni" by Basarwa.
Irish Republican Army - a militant organization of Irish nationalists who used
terrorism and guerrilla warfare in an effort to drive British forces from
Northern Ireland and achieve a united independent Ireland.
4X4, South African assembled vehicle.
Non-Governmental Organization.
The New Partnership for Africa's Development.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
Remote Area Dwellers (SanBushmen of CKGR).
The Convention on Wetlands - an intergovernmental treaty which provides
the framework for national action and international cooperation for the
conservation and wise use of wetlands and their resources. Adopted in the
Iranian city of Ramsar in 1971.
Indigenous group in Scandinavia and North West Russia.
Survival International (UK-based non-governmental organization).
Social Welfare Function. To be distinguished from a social welfare choice
and a social welfare decision.
Time Code. Time marker information on recorded Digital Tapes.
Working Group of Indigenous Minorities in Southern Africa.
Indigenous group (Bushmen) in South Africa.
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I. Introduction.
Minority: a culturally, ethnically, or racially distinct group living within a larger society. When
used to describe such a group, the term carries with it a web of political and social implications.
(EncyclopcediaBritannica)
From my grandmother, I first got to hear stories about a nomadic people living on the tundra among
dangerous animals as well as under conditions of extreme Arctic weather. Then as a little boy
watching Jamie Uys 's much-criticized film The Gods Must Be Crazy, I understood there was another
indigenous group facing problems and struggles of a kind different than my grandmother's people-
the Sami. The film portrayed the Bushmen as far away from civilization. I remember it looked
peaceful compared to my people 's situation, in the middle of a campaign against the construction of
a hydro-electric dam (see below) . Although heavily criticized, and often stereotyped as an example
of bad film-making (cf. e.g., Tomaselli, 1996), this film in fact sparked my interest in other
indigenous groups around the world. It follows that the present thesis begins from a position that is
based on the experience of myself being from an indigenous group. I will therefore proceed with a
short comparative history of my people, the Sami, and the SanBushmen to illustrate how two
democratic regimes , Norway and Botswana, have dealt with more or less the same 'problem'.
My first working experience with the Bushmen of Botswana took place as an assistant to a
Norwegian Masters student who had conducted her research in Inalegolo, Botswana, among the
Tshase people (or Basarwa). Later, my own research took me to Botswana 's Okavango Delta , where
my observations sharpened the desire to investigate further. However, due to recent political events
in Botswana (see later), this project is not what I thought it was going to be after I left the Central
Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR), the area upon which this research is based. My research assistant
requested me not to use her name, neither her recorded voice, nor her image in this report, for fear of
repercussions related to these occurrences. Additional data was also collected during June 2005 at
the "Midnight Sun Conferenc e" in Sommaroy , Tromsa Norway about indigenous law and the Sami
people, as well as other indigenous people's rights. In this respect, I had to produce this paper
without the photographs or first-hand comments I originally wanted to use, in addition to changing
my angle of investigation. By the same token, all dates are left out to be sure that sources are
protected.
In pursuing this project , I have employed the methods of
(1) auto-ethnographic elicitation, using subject-communities ' own construal of their conditions
and origins as primary data and as a source of analysis;
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(2) reflexive analysis of the relation between researcher and subject-community, taking special
note of the common political environments of indigeneity within, and the very notable
distinctions between, my own context and that of the subject-community; and
(3) logical and phenomenological (i.e. phaneroscopic, see Tomaselli 1997) interpretation of the
key concepts of development. The original hypothesis for the research was developed from
theories of media (Siebert, Lerner and Schramm, 1956), diffusion research (Rogers, 1995),
and social welfare economics (Arrow , 1951).
In brief, the present research tests the idea that development theories, whether of the modernization
or participatory kind , overlook the necessity for beneficiary communities to have already developed
both (1) a habit of ordering their perceived options into preference rankings (Arrow, 1951); and (2)
possessing sufficient internal diversity for at least some individuals to be indifferent about one or
more options available to the community at large. Both these conditions for development, as it were ,
are based on Amartya Sen's (1981) approach to socio-economic breakdown. In seeking to provide
better analytical methods for understanding the kinds of breakdown that lead to massi ve deprivation
in the form of famines, Sen develops and tests the concept of entitlement (Sen, 1981: 45-51) . This in
tum depends on a logical relation between command and endowm ent, such that the conditions for
famines, or deprivation in general , arise from social or political relations that affect either the
command, or the endowments, or both , of an identifiable section of a national population.
This is of special relevance when considering the case of Botswana. Long proclaimed as a "shining
beacon" of liberal democracy in Africa, events inside the country often contradict this perception.
During the field research for this project, we encountered widespread deprivation, even starvation,
among the Bushmen communities visited. As Kenneth Good (2003: 22) has remarked, "ethnic
minorities in the country are increasingly critical of the established "Tswanadom ' ... and their
inferior position within the supposedly 'homogeneous society. '" The presence of a liberal
constitutional dispensation, with a commitment to market principles for the economy, does not seem
to guarantee democracy in a practical sense. This was recognized by Kenneth Arrow, as far back as
1951, who used the analogy between personality integration and social integration to compare
methods of aggregating social preferences: "[t]he formal existence of methods of aggregating
individual preferences ... is certainly a necessary condition for an integrated society. ... but whether
the existence of such methods is sufficient or even forms an important part of the sufficient condition
for integration is dubious" (Arrow, 1951: 2, n.2). Indeed, Arrow receives little attention from
theorists in visual anthropology, cultural studies, and development studies. It was only by following
up Sen 's numerous references to Arrow as a source in welfare economics that directed me to the
work of Arnold Shepperson, a PhD student in the University of KwaZulu-Natal's Philosophy
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department, who showed me the decisive concepts of imposition and dictatorship that brought a
semblance of order to the confused data gathered from the field.
Arrow's work makes it possible to develop a rigorous qualitative methodology, building on a
mathematical foundation that is ordinal, but not cardinal. The rationality of this approach is
relational and not computational. In this way the researcher can avoid the a priori need to assign
values to choices, as happens in game theory, for example (see Lewis, 1968), or to assume that it is
possible to assign cardinal values to wholly emotional experiences like happiness or pain, that are
indifferent to the diversity of individual circumstances and preferences (Arrow, 1951: 9). Analysing
samples of auto-ethnographic data in which subjects express preference rankings thus avoids the
pitfalls of the researcher having to assign values prior to further analysis. People's declared
orderings of preferences are the data and any prior (mis)conceptions in research design are thereby
avoided.
This study concludes with some considerations concerning subsequent research possibilities that
account for the issues found in both Sen and Arrow, as these affect commonly used development
anthropology models, theories, and methods. At the same time, these same issues can be found in
media and cultural studies and subjected to comparable revisions in accounting for them. In brief, it
may be that democracy is a consequence of development, in contrast with the doctrines espoused by
both progressive and conservative actors in the globalization debate; neither question the convention
that democracy comes first, each merely argues for a different model of democracy (Servaes, 2001;
Kerr, 2003; Riker, 1982). The evidence indicates, however, that over a relatively short period of
development, there arise the conditions for democracy within which true progressive development
can be realized.
II. Indigenous Diversity: Scandinavia's Sami and Botswana's Basarwa.
Sami: Any of the descendants of ancient nomadic peoples who inhabited northern Scandinavia.
(Encyclopredia Britannica)
San: Also called Bushmen an indigenous people of southern Africa, related to the Khoekhoe
(Khoikhoi). They live chiefly in Botswana, Namibia, and southeastern Angola.
iEncyclopcedia Britannica).
The ten Sami groups inhabit three of the Scandinavian countries and north-western Russia (Figure
1). The Germania (AD 98) of Tacitus contains the earliest mention of the Sami by a European
historian. Of the early Scandinavian sources , the most prominent is Otere's story of English King
Alfred (AD 890 (Cultural Profiles)). The distribution shown is based on the disposition of the
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language groups, the largest of which, the Davvifsami (North Sami), is shown in dark green. The
smallest group, shown in red, are the Tersami, whose language is very nearly extinct. The Sami are
a minority throughout almost the whole of the area they inhabit, with the exception of the
municipalities Kautokeino and Karasjok in Norway and Utsjoki in Finland (Eriksson 1997:24).
Throughout Scandinavia, Sami are found outside the traditional areas shown in Figure 1, because of
recent urbanization (including the search for work) and earlier colonization processes in which the
Sami people were forced north of their homeland. A significant part of the Sami population resides
outside core area in major cities like Stockholm and Oslo: "There's a joke among the Sami's that
Oslo is the largest Sami colony in the world" (The Sdmi Homeland).
Legend
Red: Terfsarni: Verysmall group. Language nearly extinct.
Orange: Kildin Sarni. Culturally strong.
Yellow: SkoltSarniSmall,reclusive forest culture, language
endangered, strongtraditions.
Lightgreen: EnareSami. Small,culturally similarto north
Sami; the dialecthas lot in commonwith Skoltlanguage
Dark Green: Davvi- or North Sami. LargestSami group,
with many speakers of the langauge . Strong cultural
traditions in areas like chanting andhandicraft; several
indigenous-language newspapers anddaily radio
broadcasts through public serviceradio channels .
Violet Sea Sami. Own language, small in number.
Bluegreen: LuleSami. Mountain and Forestculture (Norway
and Sweden), with language strong locally.
LightBlue: PiteSami. Smallnon- or semi-nomadic culture,
language on the brinkof extinction.
Blue: Umesami. Culturally strong mountain subgroup of
SouthSami in Swedish Lapland and Mid-northern Norway.
Several educational facilities in Norway.
Dark blue: Aa~el or SouthSami. Culturally and linguistically
strong in Norway, butendangered in Sweden.
Figure 1. Distribution of Sami People Across Scandinavian Nations
Adapted from The Sami Homeland
As in the case of Botswana's Basarwa, providing exact statistics on the size of the Sami population
poses methodological problems,
This follows earlier nation state policies of assimilation and repression of the indigenous
minorities. However, it is estimated that 5,000-6,500 Sami live in Finland, 17,000-20,000 in
Sweden, about 2,000 in Russia and 40,000-45,000 in Norway. Just less than 10% of the Sami are
engaged in reindeer herding. Parts of the Sami population gain their livelihood from agriculture,
fishing and wilderness industries while many Sami are employed in the general labour market.
(MyrvollI999: 11).
The policies of the Nordic states towards the Sami , from the 19th century until after World War II,
were based on assimilation. This meant that the Sami were expected to replace their own cultural
characteristics and language with those of the majority culture. Sami culture and language, and their
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perceived traditional economy, were considered obstacles to the consolidation and social
development of the national states formed from the earlier Swedish and Danish Kingdoms , Norway
attaining independent statehood in 1905. Based on a variant of social Darwinism, this policy led to
the Norwegian authorities introducing "reforms that restricted the use of the Sami language in
schools and forbad (sic) the sale ofland to people that could not speak Norwegian. The Sami culture
was oppressed and the people "Norwegianized" (Kinsten, 2000), as well as many Sami lost their
language during this period due to the assimilation policy (The Sami Homeland).
After 1945, there was a new wave of Sami mobilisation, this time through the establishment of
national Sami organizations, beginning in Sweden in the 1950s and 1960s.1 By 1973, an elected
Sami Parliament was established in Finland. "In Norway, a major change occurred in public opinion
about the Sami situation during the conflict between the Sami and the Norwegian state over the
construction of the Alta/Kautokeino dam" (Magga 1994:43). This hydro power dam was planned
and constructed in 1979-1981, in the heart of Sami territory and created a political crisis due to
massive demonstrations from environmental organisations and the Sami people (including a hunger
strike) . Archaeological researchers from the University of Tromse had discovered ancient Sami rock
paintings in the Alta River valley and led the campaign to preserve them from being covered by the
proposed dam 's waters (Hood, 1996). The conflict engaged most of the Norwegian population as
well as newspapers and TV stations from all over the world whereby the demonstrators actively used
the international media during this period to argue for their opinion. This construction was, and still
is an important symbol for both the environmental interests in Norway and for the rights of the Sami
population.
However, their arguments were not efficient enough to stop the construction. Today you can see the
110-meter high dam; however, although the "actors lost the case ... in many ways they won the
future" (Myrvoll , 1999: 12). Yet the campaign for preservation of the rock paintings drew a
compromise from the state, in that the dam wall was constructed about 400 metres upstream (see
Figure 3) from its originally planned location so that the Alta Valley paintings would not be
drowned. A further unexpected benefit to the Sami reindeer herders was that they could migrate
across the dam wall instead of taking the long way round the deep glacial valley as they had done
before . The Alta-conflict, with the active help of media, stated some important principles regarding
the rights ofNorwegian Sami people . A Sami Parliament was established in 1989 to recognise their
rights, and today one can even see bilingual signboards, both inside buildings and in open public
spaces like roads. In sum, the controversy directed much attention to the Sami fight for their own
J Post-War Norwegian Sami mobili zation begins in 1948, with the foundat ion of Sami Reindeer Herders Association.
Later groups include the National Association of Norwegian Sami in 1968, and in 1979 the Norwegian Sarni Union was
established in response to the ongoing Alta protest action (Josefsen, 2003) .
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rights and the legitimacy of the Norwegian authorities which all together improved the political
climate for raising Sami issues (Magga 1994:49).
The Basarwa are commonly understood to be the first inhabitants of present day Botswana, and base
their claim to the indigenous first peoples of Botswana on this. Historically organised in nomadic
bands consisting ofa few extended families (ranging from 20 to 50 people), the Kalahari Bushmen
subsisted previously almost entirely by hunting and gathering:
Out of a population of 1.7 million, an estimated 50,000 people are Basarwa and a similar number
are spread through Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe and Angola . The exact figure of the
Basarwa is difficult to determine since Botswana does not differentiate on ethnic grounds,
therefore numbers of minorities are not recorded in the national census (Le Roux 1999: 15).
Band territories are sometimes as large as 1,000 square kilometres" though for part of the year a
particular band would set up camp near a 'waterhole' (Barnard, 1992: 4). Unfortunately, today this
description of their area is more or less history. In southern Africa, the various groups of foragers
are known as 'Bushmen', ' San ' or 'Khoe' (also ' Khwe') and these include numerous distinct
linguistic and identity groupings (Hitchcock, 1996: 15). The various terms used to name this people
have problematic histories, and in 1992 the indigenous NGO Kgeikani Kweni (First People of the
Kalahari or FPK) suggested the use of '/Noakhwe' (which means 'First People'). In Botswana, the
Bushmen are also known as Basarwa, although the latter term is often deemed to be pejorative as it
means 'those who don't raise cattle', indicating a primitive way oflife (Barnard and Taylor, 2002:
230-246). In Southern Africa, WIMSA 2 representatives have decided to use the term San "until such
time as one representative name for all groups will be accepted by all" (Le Roux 1999). While giving
due recognition to the difficulties associated with all these terms, in the present thesis paper I will
use the term 'SanBushmen' to distinguish the Botswana bands from other groups in southern Africa.
This specific term refers to the Gwi and Gana Bushmen of the Central Kalahari Game Reserve in
Botswana in particular (Appendix 4 and 5), the people visited by Professor Tomaselli and
undersigned, and who recently have suffered evictions and as a result have gained some prominence
in the media.
Figure 2 shows the location of the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR), within which are also
indicated the principal settlements visited during the research phase for this thesis. In the 1950s, the
British colonial administration of Bechuanaland undertook a 'Bushman survey' and in 1961 created
the CKGR. The reserve, covering an area of roughly 52,000 square kilometers, was primarily set up
to "protect the food supplies of the existing Bushmen population in this area which has been
estimated to approximately 4,000 from the activities of the European farming community at Ghanze"
2 WIMSA- Working Group of Indigenous Minorities in Southern Africa
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(Taylor, 2000: 19). In other words, the ' game reserve ' was, amongst other things, intended to
ensure that there was sustainable numbers of game for the Bushmen to hunt (Survival International:
2005). After independence in 1966, however, the government of Botswana first restricted the
hunting practices of the Bushmen by issuing licenses limiting the number of animals that could be
killed annually. In 2002, the year after they charged Bushmen for 'over -hunting' , the Botswana
Department of Wildlife and National Parks said that "it would no longer issue hunting permits to San
for use within the reserve" (Maroleng, 2002: 9). Indeed, many of these groups have become
dependent on small scale farming in small extended-family settlements, along with hunting and
gathering (Associated Press, 2002).









Map of Botswana. showing disposition of settlements in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve.
Imagefrom Survival International
Since January 2002, the government has evicted - or, in its own terms, ' relocated voluntarily'
(Government of Botswana, 2005) - a number of groups from Old Xade and Molapo within the
CKGR, resettling them in permanent settlements, such as New Xade, outside the reserve. In these
' settlements' the Bushmen have no land to roam for hunting and gathering, or to raise cattle . Limited
to a small allocation of land, the Bushmen have become reliant on government rations , and many are
said to have turned to alcoholism (Appendix 4/Tape 1. TC:12:42:15). These settlements have
become for many international observers 'places of death' , due to the rise in alcoholism and
HIV/AIDS (Gall, 2001: 236-9). In 2001 the government's own estimate of Bushmen was 687 living
inside the reserve, and 1647 living outside after being ' relocated' . There are no reliable estimates of
the present population in the reserve , but visiting those 3 settlements during the research phase , we
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met or saw fewer than 60 people in total (the research itinerary excluded one more settlement,
Gobe; it is therefore uncertain whether anyone still lives there . We were told by residents at the
settlements we did visit that there was no one left in Old Xade).
III. Development, Media, and Public Attitudes to Minorities.
Making sense of the respective political development trajectories of the Sami and SanBushmen
requires a prior analysis. The Bushmen are unable to claim differential treatment or exemption from
the Botswana government's policies of modernization and development; on the other hand, the Sami
have attained to considerable cultural autonomy. Under International Law, if the Bushmen were able
to claim that they are an 'indigenous ' group with distinct historical traditions which they wish to
preserve, then they could argue for special rights , protection, and exemption from the developmental
agendas to which the government is committed (Thornberry, 2002: 33-60). However, the
government rejects the notion that the Bushmen are 'indigenous' to the area , therefore precluding
them from claiming specific rights or exemption from modernisation. The government argues that
the term 'indigenous' should not be applied only to the SanBushmen, claiming instead that "all
residents of the country are indigenous" (Hitchcock, 1996: 15). Although this particular reasoning is
not the main argument supporting the Government's policy, denial of the Bushmen's indigenous
status ensures that development-related policies are not variably applied to the Bushmen as a distinct
cultural group . The government justifies the rejection of the Bushmen's indigeneity on the grounds
that it has always tried to "avoid ethnic identification in its programs, since in its eyes, this is
suggestive of the kinds of terminology used by those espousing apartheid (separate development)"
(Hitchcock, 1996: 15). In its "documents and policies the government consistently talks of the
Remote Area Dwellers (RADs), like any other poor rural Batswana" (Special Report, 2004) . "Since
1978, the government of Botswana prefers to use the term 'Remote Area Dwellers', "defined on the
basis of their; (1) spatial location (remote areas outside villages); (2) socio-political status
(marginalized); and (3) socioeconomic status (impoverished and subject to discrimination)"
(Hitchcock, 2004).
This strategy entrenches the Botswana government's insistence on maintaining its sovereign right to
define nationhood and belonging. In classifying the Bushmen as 'poor' - but not as ' culturally
distinct' - and then devising and implementing policies meant to target poverty, such policies show
little concern as to the 'cultural' or 'identity' erosion that result from the Bushmen's separation from
their land and traditions. Quite naturally, analysts of ethnicity and identity suggest that this approach
is problematic: Maureen Akena, a programme officer at Ditshwanelo - the Botswana Centre for
Human Rights - is reported as noting that, "the Basarwa need a place where they belong. But how do
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you recognise their need ofa sense of belonging if you don't recognise their right to their
identity?" (Special Report, 2004, see also Appendix 4 and 5)
In Norway, Sami demands for collective rights were also based on their claim to the status of an
indigenous people, in response to circumstances not of group members ' own choosing. The most
important grounds for their claim were (1) that they share cultural bonds; and (2) that "their
historical areas of habitation have been incorporated into the nation state through the use of varying
degrees of force" (Oskal1998: 149). Together, these facts imply that indigenous peoples had
previously been collectively incorporated into the nation without their consent. In parallel with
developments in the perception of the relationship between state and indigenous people, there was a
change in the way in which representation through majority election was understood. It was
recognised that if votes in an election in a multi-cultural society were given equal weight, ethnic
minorities would always be in a minority position, always at the mercy of the will of the majority.
Attempts were therefore made to find ways to ensure that the Sami had a voice and were heard.
With the establishment of the national Sami parliaments, the states accepted the principle of group
rights. Not only did the newly established Sami parliaments lead to a structural change in the
national political systems, they also led to a widened understanding of representative democracy
(Broderstad 1999: 66).
Planned location ofdam
wall before protest action
(Approximate)
---I Area ofvalley where rock
paintings are located.
Figure 3.
Aerial view of completed Alta-Kautokeino
Dam. with location of paintings and
approximate original wall position.
http://statkraft.no
A feature of the campaigns against the Alta hydro-electric dam project was the intense involvement
of international Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) - amongst others, Greenpeace
International- in their mobilization and communication aspects. In the case of the Botswana
SanBushmen, the organization Survival International, which specializes in advocacy issues affecting
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indigenous minorities, is by far the most vocal in terms of challenging the actions of the
government of Botswana's action against Basarwa, particularly those in the CKGR. It has published
extensively to very wide audiences, especially on the web.' Survival's publicized mandate is to
work closely with local indigenous organizations, employing direct personal contact with the tribal
communities to provide a platform for them to talk directly with those invading their land: "Tribal
peoples must be allowed to speak for themselves. Their own experience is the most persuasive
testimony in their defense - that is why governments strive to deny them their voice. Survival breaks
the silence by helping them take message to the outside world":
For over thirty years Survival International has been involved in what it defines as championing
tribal peoples' rights in imaginative ways. Through writing letters to relevant Governments,
companies, banks, lobbying, media, United Nations, educating the public, raising funds,
discerning information, demonstrations, bringing in tribal representatives to face governments,
companies and banks, challenging legal systems, they have been able to change the lives of
Tribal peoples across the world (Survival.org).
The organization identifies Botswana's Basarwa as one of the many tribal peoples with whom it
works. Despite Survival's claim that "there is no more powerful weapon" than the media
(Survival.org), they report little on the Basarwa's efforts to speak on their own behalf. Saugestad
(2001 :34) recounts her shock back in 1992 when she attended a workshop and heard for the first time
a Bushman speaking on a public occasion. It was Komtsha Komtsha, who made her aware for the
first time that indeed the Bushmen do speak out against the injustices they suffer. Indeed, Komtsha
has gone to the length of petitioning Queen Elizabeth II of England; the letter is reproduced as
Appendix 1.4 On the other hand, Survival claims that it was the first organization to draw attention
to the destructive effects of the World Bank structural adjustment policies, the major cause of
suffering in many poor countries. While Survival is operating from 'outside' , Ditshwanelo, the
Botswana Centre for Human Rights, operates 'locally'. Indeed, there is sufficient overlap between
the two movements' messages to narrow the divide between local and outside. Both Ditshwanelo
and Survival communicate in almost the same narrative style and tone, reporting the alleged human
rights abuses the government of Botswana has perpetrated against the Basarwa.5
3 The organization's website (http llwww.survival.org.uklbushmanpr0108.htm) uses strongly-worded headlines in
report ing on the issue . Amongst others, these include "The Bushmen peoples - the hidden face of racism today" ; "Last
Kalahari Bushmen tortured and facing starvation"; "Botswana Ignores Kalahari 'Bushman' land ownership"; "Botswana:
last ' Bushmen' in Kalahari Reserve resist eviction"; "Botswana squee zes Kalahari peoples out"; "Diamonds for land";
"Botswana persecutes Bushmen"; and " Botswana: Bushmen persecuted to drive them off their land".
4 Komtsha was one of the leaders of the Central Kalahari Bushmen. There is no record of the letter ever having been
delivered to the Queen. The text was published for the first time in Africa Reports , 29 April 2005 (Bridgland, 2005)
under the heading " Bushmen to be Denied Homeland." This article reports that Komtsha was unable to persuade anyone
to deli ver the letter before he died. During our j ourney through the CKGR, we heard more than once about letters wr itten
to the Queen of England.
5 Ditshwanelo released a 28-page report to the media, accusing the government of forcefully moving the Basarwa from
the game reserve. They alleged that there had never been proper consultation on the resettlement (Malerna, 1997).
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Ditshwanelo states that the reason that some of the Basarwa had moved could only be due to
enticement from government, because they had been promised better facilities and access to basic
needs. The'enticement' of which the government is accused (see Malema, 1997) alludes to the issue
of modernization; interviewed for a news programme, Local Government Minister Margaret Nasha
argues that the Basarwa will achieve their demands through education, and will "represent
themselves and represent themselves convincingly" when they have "the right and access to
education" (Carte Blanche, 26 February 2002) . By further arguing that the Survival-Ditshwanelo
campaign against the evictions has the result of keeping the Bushmen away from the mainstream,
and away from politics, the government position appears to be that the access to and exercise of
rights is tied to place of residence. Indeed, the government has encouraged the resettlement of the
SanBushmen since 1986; however, the decision to remove all residents from the CKGR was only
taken in late 2001, on the grounds that the state could not permit a section of the people to live
without access to modem facilities . (Carte Blanche, 26 february 2002).
The SanBushmen question this argument, as one told us "I don't want to live in a land that is not
mine. Those things, if we want them, they must bring them to us here" (See Appendix 5/ Tape 2,
TC: 13:39:10; see also Appendix 6); or as Anderson (2002) confirms "if they really want us to
modernize why don't they bring the schools and development to us in our ancestral lands?" On the
other hand, some challenge the 'drive to modernity' altogether: Daoxlo Xukuri ofFPK argues that
"Government relief is another way of killing a person; in the Reserve we knew how to provide for
ourselves". Analysts tend to agree: Alice Mogwe of Ditshwanelo explains that "the government
gives but does not empower. Its progress is based on dependency" and that Bushmen have gone
"from being resourceful to being dependent" all "in one move" (Special Report, 2004). Furthermore,
the government claims that relocating the SanBushmen is less problematic than suggested by
indigenous rights groups, such as Survival International, on the grounds that their ways of life are no
longer distinct and unique, and therefore they no longer need the reserve to protect their cultural
distinctiveness. The denial of cultural distinctiveness by the government would make it extremely
difficult to claim rights to land and its natural resources, when the Bushmen challenge the legality
and legitimacy of current law, as did the tKhomani community in South Africa.
There is a tension between development and identity at work in the SanBushmen case, comparable
with that which appears to have been resolved amicably - if not to the complete satisfaction of
everybody - in the case of Norway's Sami. Clearly, the statutory resolution of the problem of Sami
identity in a national setting occurred after a considerably longer period, beginning 1905, than has
been available in the case of the SanBushmen since Botswana's independence in 1966. In some
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measure, the Botswana minority may be seen to be subject, in somewhat more practical terms, to
the methodological tension facing anthropologists: a scientific order ofknowledge (Foucault, 1970,
1974) may be conceived as 'vanquishing' an order of'Priest-craft' (Rorty, 1980: 327; Shepperson
and Tomaselli, 1998) founded on religious, spiritualistic, animistic or other systems based on an
enchanted conception of reality. By analogy , development brings forms of social and political order
to societies in which some or other enchanted conception of reality has customarily formed the basis
for the conduct of everyday life. The problem in both cases lies in the ongoing status of the
supplanted epistemology or social order after their replacement (whether with science in the former
case or with the socio-political order of the national state in the latter). For instance,
When the ... scientific order is faced with cultures predicated on other kinds of world-views, it
responds through two mutually exclusive avenues . Either it treats the world-view and behaviour
of the Other as 'Priest-craft ' and consequently something to be vanquished. Or it views it as an
autonomous object of study and manipulation, which needs to be preserved (conserved) as such.
.. . If, however, ... the scientific gaze sees the behaviour of the Other as 'primitive' and
undesirable, then conservation fails because of the Other's being relegated into irrelevance.
When science is chosen, conservation is impossible because the Other has validity only as an
object of study in its 'raw' form (Tomaselli, 1996: 124-5).
Much the same may be said of the problem facing practitioners in the development communication
field: if we understand the culture of the Other, it is only so we may replace it with something
modem. If we impose modernity irrespective of whether or not we understand what is replaced, then
it becomes impossible to preserve the continued identity of the subject-community because within a
short time nobody will remember what was worth conservation. Epistemologically speaking , then,
the only choice for development would seem to be no development.
IV. Media and the Problem of Development and Choice.
Although the foregoing assumes a state of affairs in which the epistemic distinctions between
cultures are conceived to be extreme to the point of incommensurability, the basic point should be
noted : orthodox development theory tends to view the beneficiaries as choosing between
development and stagnation (or regression) . Criticism of development policies almost universally
proceeds from the position that beneficiaries need to be provided both with the means of choosing
freely when taking strategic decisions about development issues, and with the relevant information
about the options or alternatives between which they must choose (Servaes, 2002; Melkote and
Steeves, 2001). The objection made against existing policy usually implies that programmes are
imposed without due acknowledgement of cultural issues; Tomaselli's (1996) point being that
scientific thought is inherently incapable of grasping either (1) the frequently ideological
assumptions that allegedly inform development strategy; or (2) the 'cosmological' or 'ontological '
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grounds of'culture' that shape the ways beneficiary communities 'make meaning' of their
worlds." In the present case, the issue takes on an additional developmental dimension in that much
of the debate occurs in the media (much of it sourced to Survival International), with rival positions
being publicized in both print and electronic media. Non-Governmental Organizations frequently
base their advocacy strategies on the claim that indigenous minorities lack the means, power, or
resources to present their side of the decision-making debate to the broader public (ibid), and that
expert outside assistance - which, of course, includes public relations - will overcome this
shortcoming. The NGO sector thus claims a specialist communication function - "giving a voice to
the voiceless", for example - in the environment of ameliorating the exigencies of subsistence in
national areas lacking the infrastructure and organizational capacity to ensure social security across
the entire country.
This functional relationship between media, communication, and development has its origins in the
major expansion in Communication Science during the 1950s (cf., e.g., Tomaselli, 2005). Below I
examine a representative example of the material upon which much development communication
relies either directly or indirectly: Siebert, Peterson and Schramm's seminal Four Theories ofthe
Press (1956). This text established the dominant paradigm for analyzing global media systems and,
in particular, in assessing levels of press freedom in countries and regions of the world. The four
theories they identified were (1) the authoritarian; (2) the Libertarian; (3) the Soviet system; and (4)
the Social Responsibility paradigm.
(1) In the authoritarian state system governments take direct control of media. This system is
especially easy to recognize in pre-democratic societies, where the government consists of a
restricted, sometimes aristocratic, ruling-class. The fundamental assumption of the authoritarian
system is that the government is infallible . Media organizations and practitioners are therefore not
allowed any independence, although governments may enforce an authoritarian profile without being
openly totalitarian. A state that seems to come close to this media system today is Botswana (see
Appendices 2-4). The authoritarian system "has been most pervasive both historically and
geographically"; the goal of the media under such a system is to support and advance the policies of
the government so that it can achieve its objectives (Siebert, 1956: 18). Control mechanisms include
6 It is unclear from Tomaselli's (1996) treatment of the problem faced by documentary and ethnographic filmmakers ,
whether the incommensurability between development policy and local knowledge is based on any prior logical analysis
of relations other than the economic. Tomaselli's arguments are essentially of a linguistic nature, arguing that 'meaning'
(i.e. the semantics of words and propositions) arises from prior ontological differences between the respective world-
views of development agencies and beneficiary communities. Proceedings from the main source for Tomaselli's theory,
C.S, Peirce, then meaning is essentially a first-order phenomenon, whereas ontology is elaborated from second-order
reasoning about the object of meaning . Effectively, Tomaselli's treatment may be similar to a category confusion as
has been noted in Placide Tempels's C1958) Bantu Philosophy: that the use of language assumes either that speech "was
made for the philosophical mind only, or that stupid people who nevertheless can talk and who speak grammatically are
also philosophers" (Masolo, 1994: 102). This may also be seen as the foundational mistake in Antonio Gramsci's (1971)
political theory (I am indebted to Shepperson for this critique) .
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but are not limited to licensing systems; state censorship; special taxes; and anti-treason and anti-
sedition laws in the name of national security. Never the less, authoritarian governments do not
object to a discussion of political systems in broad philosophical terms, but stop short of allowing
direct criticism of current political leaders and their projects, or overt attempts to unseat the
authorities themselves (Siebert, 1956: 26.)
(2) Contrary to the authoritarian theory, libertarian theory holds that man is rational and an end in
himself. The happiness and well-being of the individual is the goal of society (Siebert, 1956: 40).
The "Enlightenment" gave an impetus to the concept with its call to free man from all outside
restrictions to use his reason. Siebert and his collaborators (1956: 44-47) cite John Milton, John
Stuart Mill and Thomas Jefferson as the major philosophical influences behind this concept. The
function of the libertarian media is to inform and entertain and to act as a watchdog over the
government. Libertarian media are mostly private. Control of the libertarian media is mostly
exercised through the "self-correcting" process, the civil courts, and even through licensing,
censorship or seizure of offending material; injunctions against the publication of a newspaper may
also be used. Voluntary censorship is sometimes practiced while the right of access to government
sources is avidly pursued.
(3) Social responsibility theory was an outgrowth of the libertarian theory and was first developed in
the 20th century United States by the Commission on Freedom of the Press, which emphasized social
responsibility of the press. In addition to inform, entertain and sell, the press should also "raise
conflict to the plane of discussion." (Severin and Tankard, 2001: 310). Press control is mostly in the
form of community opinion, consumer action and professional ethics. The main difference between
the libertarian theory and the social responsibility theory is that the latter suggests that someone must
see that media perform responsibly if they do not do so voluntarily.
(4) Soviet Communist theory focuses on the value of unity - unity of the working class and unity of
the Party. For the sake of unity, there is only one right position and only one truth, the absolute truth:
the doctrine and policies of the Party . Wilbur Schramm (1964 : 114) saw the Soviet political system
as "one of the most complete dictatorships in modem history". Media in communist societies are
state-owned and should be a "collective propagandist, collective agitator. .. and collective organizer"
(116) . The Soviet system defined the function of mass communications positively and removed the
profit motive from publishing and broadcasting. Under the Soviet system, the government had a
division of censorship. Other means of control included the appointment of editors, a large number
of directives regarding press content and press reviews and criticisms. Soviet systems also differ
from the authoritarian ones in that the media organizations have a certain responsibility to meet the
wishes of their audience.
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Other theories on press systems followed as the decades passed. These include developmental
journalism (popular in the Philippines and South Asia), revolutionary media (Hachten, 1999), and
democratic-participant media (McQuail, 1994). These successors mostly complement perceived
gaps in the established four-theories model. The fundamental objection against Siebert's approach is














Original retrospective diagram for the theories of the press.
http://www.geocities.comlCapitoIHiI1/21521siebert.htm#vivian#vivian
The advantage of this representation of the model lies first of all in its starting-point. The two co-
ordinates represent the two elements required for a communication event to occur: context (the
medium itself) and content (the message). The diagram, adapted from the original , permits one to
conceive the breakdown showing the relationships between strictly given categories as having a
spatial character, opening space for conceiving new ideas that relate independently to the existing
theoretical models in so far as these new conceptions themselves relate to content and context. A
further weakness is also apparent when the four-theories model is treated on a purely discursive
basis: it does not clearly display its essentially retrospective foundation: Siebert et al are effectively
discussing an existing set of dispensations in the context of a contemporary historical trajectory - the
Cold War - that was apparent to their readers of all persuasions. Represented spatially , however,
each theory can be seen as having a certain epistemological and ideological distance from the others ,
permitting the analyst to consider innovative alternative press dispensations in prospect. The same
coordinate set, that is, can be viewed looking forward in time so that any innovative theory of media
can be seen in its relation to existing theories; if the present-day media landscape no longer contains
a particular theory , one may simply exclude it from the diagram.
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Denis McQuail (2000: 161-162) offers an expanded typology of media theories, revising the 1956
theories under the heading of normative theory paradigms that consider press dispensations in just
this prospective manner. Indeed, if one considers that normative approaches have been common in
economics for decades (see, for example, Sen, 1982: 432-449; Arrow, 1951, 1963) it would seem
almost that McQuail is playing catch-up in as much as his predecessors follow a largely descriptive
theory of the press . The five paradigms, in no particular order, are:
1) Liberal-pluralist: essentially Siebert et al's (1956) model reworked as a prescriptive theory ;
2) Social-responsibility: based on norms developed around the pairing of rights/freedoms and
responsibilities;
3) Critical: theories that prescribe freedoms in terms of media production and reception that are free
of dominant or hegemonic influences;
4) Administrative: norms prescribing 'media of record' that provide information, analysis and news
to an audience of leaders/administrators in developed nations ; and
5) Cultural Negotiation: norms for media practice and goals, based on more or less radically
relativistic conceptions of culture, that eschew notions of universal rationality and encourage more or
less populist or communitarian notions of solidarity .
Because the present study is principally concerned with the African situation, most attention will be
paid to the suggestion that "we need to have a category for 'development theory' alongside the
liberal and Marxist variants" of media theory (McQuail, 2000: 155). Because of the extent to which
it has been embraced in African perspectives following UNESCO's McBride Commission (1980),
McQuail 's media theory paradigms all enumerate more or less special conditions, values, and
aspirations that developing countries may use to call for a particular media orientation that prescribes
roles serving development goals. However, analysis shows that most of these roles have already
been prescribed in some of the earlier four-theories models anyway. But more importantly, the
development support role is given precedence to the extent that it takes priority over other rights and
freedoms , especially media freedom, where the latter is defined as "the basic principle of any theory
of public communications from which other benefits flow", the protection of which is why there is
need to regulate media (McQuail, 2000: 166). This contradicts what McQuail claims is the theory's
other concern: respect for democratic communication as expressed and entrenched in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (Skogerbe, 1991: 144-146).
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McQuail (2000: Chapters 7 - 8) outlines a number of components that can be referred to as the
"public interest", including plurality of ownership; freedom of publication; diversity of information;
diversity of expression of opinion; universal reach; support for the democratic system; respect for the
judicial system ; and respect for individual and general human rights (McQuail, 2000: 142-144).
When viewed in aggregate , these criteria effectively identify development media as a species of
public sphere, a neutral space within society, free ofboth state and corporate control , in which the
media should make available information affecting the public good, and facilitate a free, open and
reasoned public dialogue that guides the public direction of society (Curran, 2000: 135). Objectivity
is a prerequisite to quality information and helps to increase public confidence and trust in what they
receive through the media. Objectivity deals with facts, and facts are essential in discourses that take
place in the public sphere (McQuail , 2000: 173). These standards entail mixed and divided
responsibilities for media , in order to reach alternative social groups and subcultures, and reflect
fairly the expression of conflicts and inequalities of society (McQuail , 2000: 175). Media ownership
concentration, therefore, threatens the right to uncensored information and freedom of speech of the
individual journalists.
v. Media, Development and Welfare: General normativity in society
and culture.
Looking back at the various approaches used in media theory and to develop theories of the press, it
becomes clear that all theorists have certain things in common. For all of them, media act to foster
democracy. What largely divides them into different camps is their conception of democracy. For
Siebert et at(1956), democracy means mainly the US model of two-party representative government
with a strict separation of powers. For the more critical school of thought, democracy means
participatory democracy in various forms. I have not examined dependency theory in any detail,
mainly because this paradigm essentially uses a rhetorical strategy of redefinition to argue that
development actually 'means' (see Note 6 above) dependency on the developed world. However,
the development communication and media theories of Servaes (2002) and of Melkote and Steeves
(2001), amongst others, prescribe certain development benefits that flow from free, democratic, and
participatory media, also found in the four-theory model. These include:
I) Social stability (authoritarian model) ;
2) Curbing excesses of the State (libertarian model) ;
3) Raising conflict to the level of discussion, to reduce public violence (social responsibility theory);
4) Protection of rights (Hamel ink, 2001; McQuail, 2000);
5) Developing the public sphere (Hamelink, 2001; McQuail , 2000; Servaes , 2002); and
6) Preserving the cultural integrity of communities (Melkote and Steeves, 2001; Servaes, 2002).
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If these are considered broadly in relation to the goals of development, they are conditions that can
be seen as promoting a certain kind of non-oppressive social state . Arrow (1951: 17) defines a
social state generally as:
... a complete description of each type of commodity in the hands of each individual, the amount
of labour to be supplied by each individual, the amount of each productive resource invested in
each type of productive activity, such as municipal services, diplomacy and its continuation by
other means, and the erection of statues to famous men. It is assumed that each individual in the
community has a definite ordering of all conceivable social states, in terms of their desirability to
him. It is not assumed here that an individual's attitude toward different social states is
determined exclusively by the commodity bundles that accrue to his lot under each. It is simply
assumed that the individual orders all social states by whatever standards he deems relevant.
It is obvious that this model shares the basis used for earlier economic modernization approaches to
development, since the definition does not take account of indigenous cultural factors. However, one
can exploit this definition in the context of Sen's (1981) broad concept of entitlement and its
collateral concepts of command and endowment. In general, entitlements are defined in terms of the
legal ability of persons to command? due access to or consumption of the basic goods, services or
commodities covered by reigning conceptions of Right; for example, ownership of food
.. . is one of the most primitive of property rights , and in each society there are rules governing
this right. The entitlement approach concentrates on each person's entitlements to commodity
bundles including food, and views starvation as resulting from a failure to be entitled to a bundle
with enough food (Sen, 1981: 43).
Food entitlements are part of a person's broader endowment bundle , that includes land , labour power,
and so on (ibid.). In the foregoing, the supposed benefits of the press and other media may not be
understood in the same kind of economic terms , although there is no reason to exclude from persons '
endowment bundles such conditions for enjoyment of press and other freedoms as literacy and
access to a reasonable education (however the latter may be definedj. f
One will not, of course, starve because of illiteracy; but one 's endowment bundle could well be
restricted as a result of inadequate literacy skills. Similarly, it is not inconceivable that, as with the
Sami before their lobbying had its effect, adequate literacy in an indigenous minority language
would not add to one's endowment bundle relative to formal system of rights and welfare benefits
7 Strictl y speak ing, Sen considers command as a property of the exchange entitlement mapping (EEM), a "function that
specifi es the set of alternative commodity bundles that the person can command respectively for each endowmen t
bundle" (Sen, 1981 : 46). For the present thes is, however, I will use' command ' instead of EEM, because this can help
with class ifying the forms of entitlement ascribable to different actors in the development environment. The reason for
this will become clear , because I am spec ificall y interested in the role of non-citi zen actors in the fields of both
development and of indigenous minor ity rights, and discuss this in more deta il toward the end of the thes is.
8 In 1998 Amartya Sen received the Stockholm Prize in Economics (often mistakenly called the Nobel Economics Prize)
for his work on the formal economic nature of poverty. In much of his work Sen acknowledges Arrow as both a
predecessor and as a colleague (both were active at Harvard Universit y), and Sen 's relationship with Arrow may be seen
as all ~f~rote,g~ , critic , colleague, and elaborator. This does not in any way detract from the enormous intellectual scope
of Sen s mqumes, and Sen may equally be seen as having influenced Arrow's later work.
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available in a country in which another language enjoys priority. To account for these
considerations, Arrow's basic idea can be rewritten to refer to a cultural state visualised for
development, as:
A complete description of the symbolic power at the disposal of each individual both within and
outside his or her community, the quality of critical engagement available to individuals in
relation to power, the knowledge, learning, and cultural resources at the disposal of individuals as
far as these will facilitate authentic contributions to the symbolic life of communities and
societies. It is assumed that each individual in the community has a definite ordering of all
conceivable cultural states, in terms of their desirability to him or her. It is not assumed here that
an individual's attitude toward different cultural states is determined exclusively by the symbolic
bundles that accrue to her lot under each . It is simply assumed that the individual orders all
9cultural states by whatever standards he or she deems relevant.
Thus the media and communication sides of the development problem can be understood as
involving how individuals can know and understand the choices available to them in their own
context. Each of these conceptions of State may be related to Sen's (1992) discussion of Freedom.
Arrow's social state is applicable in the context of Well-being Freedom, to "achieve those things that
are constitutive of one 's well-being" (Sen, 1992: 57-72). On the other hand , my proposed cultural
state is relevant to the question of Agency Freedom, to "bring about the achievements one values and
which one attempts to reproduce" (ibid.). All but Siebert et al's Soviet theory of media and
journalism meet some or even most of these requirements, even though it may be that none presently
meet them all. Essentially, then, attainment of the entitlements empowering command over the
preferential choice of a valued cultural state is a definition of cultural autonomy that complements
the economic autonomy embodied in Arrow's definition of a Social state.
It is obvious that in the libertarian theory, an individual's command over symbolic power depends on
how he or she disposes of wealth - the richer one is, the more one can draw on exchange
entitlements to command social and cultural goods (for instance, for purchasing the technology and
bandwidth for communicating on the internet). Under the social responsibility theory, the media
institutions ensure access to symbolic power, but the knowledge and learning available to exercise
one 's well-being or agency freedoms become limited to that which the organization can pay for. The
development support communication model ensures the cultural integrity of indigenous
communities, but at the price of communities' own critical voice . This is mainly (but not only)
because development bodies or civil society dispose of agency freedoms that often draw on other
cultural resources to make the case for local agency freedom empowerment, often at the expense of
their supposed beneficiaries' well-being freedom (the case of Survival International in Botswana is a
good example). In the Another Development model (see Servaes, 2001; Melkote and Steeves, 2000 ;
9 My thanks to Arnold Shepperson for his interpretation of Arrow that avoids the economic models of development
thinking.
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Rogers, 1995; Ross and Usher, 1986), the attention is paid to protecting or enhancing traditional or
customary agency freedom in an existing cultural state without thinking about symbolic choices that
media in democratic societies offer to communities: to protect and enshrine a community's existing
culture more or less unchanged would seem to hinder their broader democratic symbolic power and
not strengthen it.
Thus the non-authoritarian theories of media and communication each have some necessary cultural
contribution to make, but none is both necessary and sufficient to ensure the accomplishment of
development. In the following section I wi11100kat the case of Australian academic Kenneth
Good's expulsion from Botswana. This can be seen as a study in authoritarian press practice even
though the Botswana constitution is supposed to support libertarian values, especially from the point
of view of entitlements defined under the idea of well-being freedom.
VI. The Fragility of Media Freedom: the Kenneth Good affair.
For all that Botswana has had a lot of attention from the developed world because of the stability it
has provided to investors, things are not as settled as this perception suggests. Electoral turnout is
low , and opposition parties are disorganized and lack capacity. Media workers are restricted from
getting information from Government sources by strict anti-whistleblower provisions (Good, 2003 :
1). Various other impediments and technical factors limit newsgathering and dissemination of the
Botswana media. Lack of mobility and of suitable telecommunication facilities hinder journalists
from fully acting as watchdogs for society. On the one hand, this could be ethnically-based, or
politically motivated, where a journalist in an editorial position in a media organization is there
because of considerations independent ofjournalistic criteria and therefore cannot criticize the
political leaders who appointed them. On the other hand, government officials are reluctant to
release information that would help the journalists educate the public on critical issues, (Mogekwu,
1995: 312-313; 318; Zaffiro, 1999). Thus the ostensibly libertarian constitutional basis for
Botswana's media is contradicted by two elements identifiable from both Siebert and McQuail. In
the first instance, media practitioners are either beholden to the Government for their positions, or
restricted by underdevelopment from pursuing their roles; these factors put an authoritarian face on
media that are in no way at odds with policy implementation. In other words, development and
communication are effectively imposed on the citizenry and minorities. In the second, media are not
consumed to their full potential because of the limited level of adult literacy in the media consuming
public. Media, that is to say, may well entertain through radio or television; but their capacity to
inform and educate is restricted, respectively, by the influence of authorities with agendas based on
the maintenance of power, and by the incapacity of citizens at large to follow up on topics of
importance by other means. Put differently, to hear about a problem of national importance without
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being sufficiently literate to find further information to read does not broadly constitute
communication in the sense that either Siebert or McQuail conceived it.
An example of how this effect plays out in reality may be seen in the recent (July 2005) expulsion of
academic Kenneth Good from Botswana, on the grounds that media reports of his work had
undermined the credibility of the state. An example of his work is the report he prepared (Good,
2003) for the Nordiska Afrikainstitutet on the state of political and economic democracy in
Botswana. In the report , Good notes that the country has developed into a largely presidentialist
political system, with considerable power concentrated in the hands of the President and the Chief of
the Defence Force, while the processes of Government are largely kept secret under the terms of the
National Security Act (Good, 2003: 9-10). Economically, the country relies heavily on diamond
exports for foreign exchange and employment outside the State structures, a situation that potentially
leads to instability (Good, 2003: 24). Most relevant for this thesis is that there remains persistent
inequality between the ethnic Tswana elite and other groups, including the SanBushmen, that
excludes minorities from the full benefits of development (Good, 2003: 14-16). Although Good had
been Professor of Political Science at the University of Botswana for fifteen years, and could hardly
be considered an 'undesirable alien' after such a lengthy residence, his record of critical research and
international connections were to be of no help when word got out that he was to present a public
speech on Presidential succession in Botswana (See Appendix 2c).
Good had prepared a paper critical of state policy on the problem of development and political
succession in African states, which included criticism of the handling of the SanBushmen of CKGR.
When word got about that Good was to present the paper to a public gathering, the state issued a
deportation order with a 48-hour deadline. The order was issued on a Friday, effectively prohibiting
Good from presenting his paper as scheduled on Monday. However, by appealing immediately
against the order, Good was nevertheless able to deliver the paper at the University of Botswana the
following week pending the outcome of the appeal. The details of the episode are presented as
Appendix 2a/2b; the present point is that aside from Good's local work as an academic, he was
known to have been in contact with other academics and civil society organizations globally .
Whether the prospect of unfavourable reports resulting from the proposed speech was the principal
reason for Good's deportation is not the issue here, however. What is of some interest, however, is
that Good was known for his media profile and contact with the NGO sector. Indeed, one may well
stop to consider how much of a media event Good 's expulsion became; the point is not that there
was some conspiracy, or any concerted policy involved, but that the added media attention to the
CKGR SanBushmen in the context ofother sensitive issues changed the profile of the affair.
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The prospective role of media discourse in this context has definite parallels with what occurred in
Norway during the Alta/Kautokeino protests of 1979-81. Among these parallels are (1) the use of
celebrity media messages and activism to draw public attention to socio-political issues of certain
business practices, like whaling (Norway) or diamonds (Botswana); (2) the mobilization of
indigenous minority concerns in connection with these practices (the Sami in Norway and
SanBushmen in Botswana); and (3) NGOs raising single issues in media reports to act as a proxy for
wider local issues that would not gain international public attention if reported in normal journalistic
styles. The general response to the Norwegian-Sami issue was the ultimate establishment of an
autonomous Parliament for an indigenous minority. To date, the SanBushmen of Botswana have
experienced nothing that has actually diminished their marginality in the land of their birth. Their
situation mirrors exactly the problem with earlier conceptions of development that the process must
apply to
... to all levels of all societies, not just the poor of the non-aligned world. It grew from
dissatisfaction with the 'consumer society' , with what is sometimes termed 'overdevelopment' or
even 'maldevelopemt' as well as the growing disillusionment with the modernization approach.
The central idea, which is pointed out by almost everyone who is searching for newer approaches
towards development, is that there is no universal path to development - it must conceived as an
integral, multidimensional and dialectic process that can differ from one society to another
(Servaes 2002:78).
However, the Sami experience suggests that there may be something left out of this statement of the
problem: after all, barely 10% of their number engages in the traditional economy of reindeer
herding, and their attainment of autonomy as an indigenous minority hardly depended on the
preservation of the practice. Indeed, one would hardly distinguish a Sami from other individuals in
terms of their consumer patterns, despite the dictum of the' Another Development' paradigm that
national constitutions ought to "enshrine cultural freedom as one of the pillars on which the state is
founded" (Servaes, 2002: 128).
The critique of development, that it did not solve the problem of "the one sided economic strategy of
unbalanced growth" associated with earlier projects (Servaes, 2002: 21) , does not invalidate the
necessarily economic innovations that accompany a society's shift from subsistence to exchange
systems of production, distribution, and consumption. As Good (2003: 33) showed, the "foundation
for a widening and deepening of democracy remain extremely frail" in countries where indigenous
status excludes people from the benefits of development. This is not a situation where development
is either economic or culturally sensitive, however. Taking Sen's (1981: 43-4) discussion of
entitlement and command into account, the situation indicates that both cultural and economic
factors are equally indicators of a deeper condition that very clearly involves the ways that different
people 's endowments are acknowledged by, and accommodated in, the rules of society. People 's
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endowments may be perfectly adequate to a given environment of conduct, a 'space of action ' so
to speak, within which their abilities enable them to command social and cultural goods that are
themselves adequate to the continuation of their communities' ways of life . On the other hand, it is
doubtful whether accommodation and acknowledgement, sufficient conditions for some sort of co-
existence between minorities and majorities, constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions for
some measure of mutually satisfactory welfare.
Thus another way of considering the economic dimension, that perhaps encompasses Servaes 's
concerns, would be to recall, and account for, the fact that the economies of developed national states
also incorporate a strong element of welfare. The Sami had become part of the Norwegian welfare
system from an early stage; the indigenous peoples of Botswana , especially the SanBushmen, are
actively excluded from the welfare system (Good, 2003, Kerr, 2001). The widely disparate
accomplishments of these two indigenous minorities certainly shows that where the former clearly
enjoy growing measures of both social and cultural welfare in Norway, the condition of the latter,
regrettably, exemplifies radical illfare (Arrow, 1951: 25). If the state and quality of development are
to be seen as leading to the implementation of both economic and cultural benefits, therefore , then it
may be worthwhile treating development in general as a broad kind of welfare provision. Welfare
economics, as noted above, provides a way of defining the cultural state of countries that is logically
the same as Arrow's (1951) economic definition. Although Sen (1981,1982,1992, amongst others)
has done impressive logical work on the roles, causes, and effects of poverty and inequality on
welfare economic theory, and on developing the formal conditions for the deep analysis of why
economics has tended to be more of a dismal art than an exact science, he never the less
acknowledges that Arrow's Impossibility Theorem is "a remarkable result, of great analytical
beauty", and "also surprisingly robust" (Sen, 1982: 337). In the following section , therefore , I will
examine Arrow's handling of the logical problem of welfare economics, much neglected in the
development communication literature, in order to throw some light on why the choice of
development seldom leads to any accomplishment of development.
VII. Formalising Development and Choice.
In any situation of social choice, the method of summing up the preferences indicated in the public
act of choosing runs up against a paradox. This is Kenneth Arrow's (1951) celebrated General
Theorem of the Possibility of Social Welfare Functions, commonly known as the "Impossibility
Theorem". Informally, the theorem states that "the only methods of passing from individual tastes to
social preferences which will be satisfactory and which will be defined for a wide range of sets of
individual orderings are either imposed or dictatorial" (Arrow, 1951: 59). By imposition Arrow
means merely that a definite set ofindividual preferences is taken to constitute the overall social
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preference.i" More specifically, this refers to a situation where a definable group within a society
effectively defines what shall constitute the form and delivery of a social good after society has gone
through the act ofchoosing. In practical terms, this merely means that the method of deciding the
form of the desired social good rests with a political party or professional expert opinion.
On the other hand, a social welfare function is dictated if a single definite individual preference
trumps all the corresponding ordering of preferences among choosers other than that specific
individual. 11 Given that those who choose may be viewed collectively as an individual (much like
corporate respondents are treated as individuals in many legal systems), this means that when a
single faction orchestrates the preference for some good within a broader coalition or other social
collection irrespective ofwhether a majority are indifferent to that preferred good, that preference is
dictated. For example, if a small Trotskyist revolutionary grouping within a larger socialist trade
union grouping threatens to wreck consensus unless their agenda is given equal weight in public
communications, then the union grouping's stated preference for Trotskyite programmes has been
dictated by a faction that does not actually command a majority in the organization.
Arrow's theorem is based on two Axioms, one essentially logical that refers to a general property of
weak ordering, the other essentially mathematical, stating the property of transitivity ofordinal
relations. The first Axiom establishes the property of quasi-commutativity of the relation R, for
alternative social goods x and y:
AXIOM I: For all x and y, either xRy or yRx,
where R denotes the relation "prefers or is indifferent to" (Arrow, 1951: 12), and represents a weak
ordering relation. A strong ordering is a preference, denoted P, and is effectively non-commutative
in the aggregation ofchoices. This is because, from Axiom I, it is necessary that indifference
between x and y also imply indifference between y and x, given that the relation R is ordinal in either
order of completing the set <x,y>. In another format, one may denote this property as defining
preference as ifxPy, then -ykx, and ifyPx, then -xRy, in relation to the weak ordering relation R.
AXIOM II: For all x, y, and z, xRy and yRz imply xRz.
A relation satisfying Axiom II is said to be transitive (Arrow, 1951: 13).
10 Arrow's formal definition of an imposed social welfare function relies on the correspondence between weak ordering
relations, R, within a set of choosers, and the anticipated corresponding relation R such that society at large either prefers
0: i~ indifferent.to some social good . Formally, "A social welfare function will be said to be imposed if, for some pair of
distinct alternatives x and y , xRy for any set of individual orderings Rt, ... , Rn, where R is the social ordering
corresponding to Rt, ... , Rn" (Arrow, 1951: 28).
II Formally defined, a dictated social welfare function relies on the relation between an individual preference ordering,
P, and the overall social preference indicated in the act of choosing. Formally, "A social welfare function is said to be
dictat~ri~1 i.f there exists an individual i such that, for all x and y, XP;)l implies xPy regardless of the orderings Rt, ... , R
n
of all individuals other than i , where P is the social preference relation corresponding to Rt, ... , Rn" (Arrow : 1951: 30).
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This axiom enables one to analyse the preferences expressed in a social environment as a series of
pair-wise comparisons. Since the question of social choice is considered specifically in relation to
"democratic capitalist" society (Arrow: 1951: 1-2), the only relevant method of aggregating
individual choices into a social choice is that of majority voting (Arrow, 1951: 46). In any general
process of voting, however, once the environment of social choice expands to contain more than two
choosers among three or more options, the well-known phenomenon of a cycling majority appears,
also known as the Voter Paradox, which is readily demonstrated in the case of three options available
for three choosers:
LetA, B, and Cbe the three alternatives, and 1,2, and 3 the three individuals. Suppose
individual 1 prefers A to Band B to C (and therefore A to C), individual 2 prefers B to C and C to
A (and therefore B to A), and individual 3 prefers C to A and A to B (and therefore C to B). Then
a majority prefer A to B, and a majority prefer B to C. We may therefore say that the community
prefers A to Band B to C. If the community is to be regarded as behaving rationally, we are
forced to say that A is preferred to C. But in fact a majority of the community prefer C to A
(Arrow, 1951 : 3).





Table 1. Sample of voter paradox for three actual choices from three options among three choosers.
In effect, Table 1 merely displays the fact that a society of three choosers may express no overall
preference from among three options from which to express their individual priorities. Of course,
these expressed priorities also reflect a system ofpreferences, in that (for example) voter 1 prefers A
to B, B to C, and, by transitivity, A to C, as Arrow demonstrates. The same kinds of rankings apply
to voters 2 and 3. On the other hand, each voter's prioritization represents an individual selection
from a much wider set preference rankings, which I will designate C(S), drawn from the set of all
possible pair-wise preferences that may be expressed from then the set <A; B; C> (the collection
being that from which selections are to be made). 12 The full range of possible alternatives expressed
as preferences (that is, for the present ignoring indifference) is therefore:
12 In reality, the ni~e pair-wise preferences shown in this demonstration are a composition of the six (3! = 6) possible
ordenngs of three Items. Although Arrow (195 I : 3, n.3) cites one EJ. Nanson as the source for this in an article of 1882








Where P denotes the relation "prefers", for example APB means "prefers A to B", and so on. If one
tabulates the expressed priorities as expressed preference rank-orderings (Table 2), therefore, a





Table 2. Second-order ranking of sample of priorities expressed in Table 1.
It is immediately clear that already there are fi ve rank-orderings between options expressed in Table
2. The pair-wise orderings Ri; and Rvi both refer to alternatives validly chosen from the set C(S), but
which by virtue of Axiom II (the principle of transitivity) actually broadens the range of expressed
preferences. Thus the point that Arrow is making is not merely that cycling majorities are still not
eliminated by aggregating individual preferences into a function that validly represents the collective
social preference for the overall collection of choosers: in effect, Arrow's Theorem states the
conclusion that imposition or dictatorships are the only two fair or logical methods for breaking a
cycling majority, respectively.
It should also be noted that although Arrow's deduction proceeds from an axiom of transitivity in
much the same manner as in Game Theory, the theorem is not a variation on the latter. Most
commonly, Game Theory is taken to refer to situations of conflict, in which strategies are pursued
until players either win or lose according to the rules of the game in question. But there are also
games of coordination, in which optimal strategies are directed at accomplishing some common end .
David Lewis (1968) notes that different coordination strategies may be ranked as preferences such
that certain combinations reflect a range of possible cultural viewpoints (he used the status quo, lone
disobedience, and the State ofNature as examples of environments within which coordination is
summary of methods used to break cycling majorities. It is notable in Green- Armytage 's summary that such methods
can become extraordinaril y compl ex, wh ile never being wholly satisfactory.
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more or less readily attainable). In some respects, then, Arrow defines the method of choosing
such that methods of aggregating individual preferences into a social choice cover both competitive
and coordination solutions in a given environment.
The logical mechanism whereby Arrow accommodates this is the idea of a quasi-ordering, a
preference ranking, designated Q, that would obtain if society were to consider itself adequately
compensated after having adopted the goods chosen (Arrow, 1951: 34-35). The very terminology of
this concept explains its relevance: a quasi-ordering is such because it denotes an ordering R that
does not as yet obtain, but which would obtain once implementation is accomplished. The properties
of Qare almost identical to those ofR, with the exception that for alternatives x and y, xQy for any
individual does not imply xPy for the society at large; it merely implies that at least one individual is
expected to be better off under x than under y. Since the establishment in the present of a future
dispensation of preference is not admissible under a strict doctrine of Nominalism, therefore, an
expected ordering is necessarily a quasi-ordering, an arbitrary forecast about what should be the
case if x and not y were to obtain. It follows from this that if we can say of only one individual that
they would no longer prefer y to x, then if that individual's ordering is implemented as the social
choice, the decision has been made as a dictated function. Similarly, if some set of individuals
coordinate their ordering such that they would no longer prefer y to x, and that coordination acts to
aggregate the ordering of the social choice, then that coordination is accomplished as an imposed
function (Arrow, 1951: 28-31).
VIII. The Development Paradox? Impossibility, Choice, and Participation.
It is notable that Arrow's conception of an environment of choice (the formalities of which are not
necessary for the present thesis) is based on a strictly modernistic characterisation of the nature of
society :
To the nominalist temperament of the modem period, the assumption of the existence of the
social ideal in some Platonic realm of being was meaningless. The utilitarian philosophy of
Jeremy Bentham and his followers sought instead to ground the social good on the good of
individuals. The hedonist psychology associated with utilitarian philosophy was further used to
imply that each individual's good was identical with his desires. Hence, the social good was in
some sense to be a composite of the desires of individuals. A viewpoint of this type serves as a
justification of both political democracy and laissez-faire economics or at least an economic
system involving free choice of goods by consumers and of occupations by workers (Arrow,
1951: 22-3).
The reigning (self-proclaimed) post-modem media and communication studies paradigm - following
the collapse of the bipolar superpower system (see Kennedy, 1988-89) - makes much of how
critically-based collectivist or communitarian systems of thought have supplanted the supposedly
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individualistic conceptions of human value and political-economic strategy of the earlier era (see,
for example, Mudrooroo, 1997) . However, the replacement of earlier collective conceptions like
'class' and 'nation ' with more ethnographically derived terms like 'community' and 'culture ' merely
shifts the individualist analysis to the level of the collected members of each aggregation. Put more
simply: the post-modem state of nature pits singular 'cultures ' or 'communities ' against each other
in a purportedly politico-symbolic state of nature, in place of Thomas Hobbes's (1963) early modem
conception of the individual in a politico-economic state of nature against every other individual.
Effectively, one could say that classical modernist theory in politics and economics admitted of no
'shades of grey ' between the existent individual and the existent national state; post-modernism
identically insists on a comparable gulf between individual existent communities only. All this
indicates that the ' post ' in 'post-modem' may more validly be replaced with a qualifier like 'Hyper'.
Logically, one may treat any given 'community' or ' culture' as an individual, especially in the
context of contemporary notions based on what Charles Taylor (1991) defined as the "ethics of
authenticity", or of theories that inherit the late Enlightenment philosophies of expressivism (see
Taylor, 1989). Each individual culture or community has an identity which members are obligated
(more or less) to express in their interactions with other groups ' members. At the limit , there is
consequently nothing particularly contradictory in positing that in an environment of communitarian
social choice each community will express as singular a set of preferences and values as did
individual persons under the circumstances Arrow has defined. Most importantly, if one considers
that the expressed preference rankings of a community - as asserted in, say, an environment within
which is to be chosen amongst alternative development strategies - may be the result of prior
coordination solutions internal to the cultures or communities being called upon to choose, then
Arrow's Theorem will hold, irrespective ofthe transparency and openness ofthe internal processes
by which each community came to its express preference. In the present thesis, this phenomenon is
of particular interest in respect of how participatory development communication models seem not to
deliver results that are any more acceptable than earlier top-down methods. In the following, I
discuss some of the ways these considerations affect the comparative conditions of the Sami and
SanBushmen.
It is not widely known that many Sami were active in the resistance movement against Norway's
Nazi occupiers between 1940 and 1945; however, as early as 1957 the Norwegian film "Ni Liv"
(Nine Lives, nominated for the Oscar category of Best Foreign Language Film in 1958), based on the
true story of Jan Baalsrud, a member of the Norwegian resistance during World War II. In 1943, he
and numerous other resistance fighters embarked on a dangerous mission to destroy a German air
control tower and recruit for the resistance. The mission was compromised, and their boat was
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attacked by a German vessel. Baalsrud was the only one to escape the Nazi onslaught, and evaded
capture for roughly two months, suffering from frostbite and snow blindness. "He failed in his bid to
reach the border of neutral Sweden and took refuge with some Norwegians who happened to have
access to the Norwegian underground. While hiding in their bam, he amputated a significant number
of his own frostbitten toes with an ordinary knife. These civilians managed to move Baalsrud close
to the Swedish border, but were forced to leave him in a snow cave for roughly two weeks before
they returned and delivered him to a reindeer herder who finally took him over the frontier to
safety". (Wikipedia; International Movie Database).
The Norwegian resistance being a relatively coherent national resistance force , with many operations
involving action (either armed or reconnaissance) against installations well inside traditional Sami
areas (see Figure 1),13 it would not be out of place to suppose that many ethnic Sami resistance
fighters soon developed a habit of coordinating with their ethnic Norwegian comrades on operations.
It is not clear whether resistance units were integrated, or whether ethnically-distinct groups
cooperated on single operations (or, for that matter, whether there was a mixture of units) ; in either
case, coordination would have been crucial, and a habit of such coordination is not inconceivable on
the part of either component. Although Sami representatives had been elected to the Norwegian
Parliament prior to 1940, and there was probably some expectation that these would have
coordinated more or less freely with their Norwegian colleagues, the experience and habits of
coordination in combat are a very different matter. Not least, veterans would have had memories
simply not possible for a generation that had not undergone the same experiences. These same
veterans, therefore, could have had some measure of influence a generation later, when the
Alta/Kautokeino dam protests got underway. The shortfall in the record of Sami-Norwegian
resistance co-ordination is finally being addressed officially: on October 10, 2005, the Norwegian
president of the Sami Parlament Sven-Roald Nyste, announced that finally, "the work done by the
Sami border guides was to be recognized by the Norwegians". Amongst other actions, a
Documentation Centre is to be set up to acknowledge the Sami contribution during World War II
(Hivand, 2005).
The role of the international NGO Greenpeace in the Alta/Kautokeino protests, and their
mobilization of global media to publicise the issue, may therefore be viewed from the point of view
of Arrow's Theorem in so far as - given a memory of cross-ethnic coordination a generation before -
this campaign accurately reflected the situation on the ground. Greenpeace hardly can be said to
have started anything in connection with the Alta/Kautokeino protests, because this was not the first
13 ~he German Kriegsmarin e maintained several bases in this area , and the Luftwaffe also pursu ed operations against
Allied convoys to and from Archangel and Murmansk from this region .
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dam against which Norwegian environmental groups had protested. The main group involved was
"Folkeaksjonen mot utbygging av Alta-Kautokeino-vassdraget" (Public Subscription Association
Against the Alta-Kautokeino Dam) which short time after being established, had 20 000 members
(Jhar, 2004). The Youth and Nature Organization, a branch of the Green Party, also carried out a
major mobilization drive (Natur og Ungdom). The main problem to be faced in this context lies not
in the nature and radicalism of the Sami autonomy or independence movements. Instead, I want to
look at the degree to which the Greenpeace strategy might have led to representations that
contradicted Sami experience ofNorwegian nationality through 1945 and beyond. There were some
Sami splinter groups who called for an armed struggle (see, for example, Bjergo, 2003, for a
summary of Sami extremist links to other armed groups like ETA and the IRA), but their influence
was small. More important is Greenpeace, who was the major international NGO involved with
increasingly radical opposition to Norwegian whale and seal hunting. They piggy-backed their own
agenda onto the established local environmental activism. Although this may have added to the
international publicity it did not really change the strategies already being used. The point then,
would be to see how far Greenpeace strategists needed to depart from their focus on maritime
environmental activism, because that was an issue toward which Sami were (and remain) largely
indifferent.
It is probable that combining the mainly environmental and cultural Alta/Kautokeino campaign with
practices unfamiliar to the Sami, could have largely have made actual Sami concerns appear
marginal, because the whole object of Sami activism was rooted in more local issues. Thus, the
lead-up to the stage when Sami community and activist leaders could have agreed to argue alongside
Greenpeace for a particular cultural choice would possibly have involved (a) more effort in
convincing the indifferent that an environmental angle to the cultural issue would improve the Sami
bargaining position; and (b) that such a rhetorical tactic would improve the chances for a more
equitable outcome for the implementation of any future autonomy or independence policies . While
the first option hardly differs from any text-book situation involving voter persuasion in a settled
electoral system, the second in combination with the first introduces a quasi-ordering into the choice
environment: Arrow's Theorem will hold, and the issue becomes one of whether any function for
aggregating preferences will be imposed or dictated. 14
(2) The present controversy over the CKGR SanBushmen involves far less extensive historical
relations than in the case of the Sami in Norway. Firstly it needs to be recognized that the Sami
question involved a very different form of historical interaction with their state of residence, some
considerations on which I have already outlined. The SanBushmen have related to the state of
14 Recent Greenpeace initiatives in Scandinavia seem to have adopted a more co-operative strategy than that employed in
the Alta/Kautokeino protests; see Pitkanen (2005).
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Botswana for a relatively paltry 39 years, less than half the time Sami have related to the state of
Norway. If one includes the earlier relation with Sweden prior to Norway's independence in 1905, it
is clear that the SanBushmen have little comparable history upon which to draw. It is because of this
that the relation between the CKGR communities and Survival International must be seen as more
decisive than had been the case with Greenpeace and the Sami; Survival very much calls the shots in
terms of strategy and intervention programme design, having little immediate reason for
compromising in the way Greenpeace did. Indeed, there is little about which the SanBushmen can
actually form preference rankings: their situation involves something closer to a dilemma than an
environment of choice. On the other hand, I have already noted that the CKGR Bushmen do not
themselves oppose development (Andersson, 2002); it is, rather, the NGO FPKI5 that mobilises
mainly post-modern (hyper-modern) theory to claim that the SanBushmen do not really need
development.
The issue is such that there is little that can be characterised as a viable quasi-ordering for the
Bushmen in their relation with the state. On the other hand, the response of the Botswana
government suggests that their political security is high enough for them not to consider any
alternatives that might conceivably act to reduce their apparently secure hold on power. But this
situation may be more artificial than the marker of some 'authentic' quality in Motswana culture'",
In the first instance, the state is signatory to a very restricted set of international Declarations.
Although signatory to the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, the
Ramsar Declaration, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, there are other such
conventions that Botswana has yet to ratify. In the present context, the most noteworthy of these is
ILO Convention No. 169, concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries
(1989). In large measure, it is possible to consider the range of ratified conventions as a proxy for
the range of choices from which a developing state and its citizens could propose social and cultural
choices for which individuals (classical or hyper-modern) might express a preference ordering, or
toward which they might be indifferent. Decisively, if there are more options from which choices
might be made, it is easier to make a credible case for the quasi-ordering of any possible social or
cultural choices based on issues covered by such conventions.
(3) Reading Arrow's (1951) arguments, it would be easy to dismiss the conclusions as irrelevant in a
post-national environment. However, I have noted that it is possible to consider much of the 'post'
in these objections to be 'hype', in the sense that the 'posted' concept (the nation, modernity, the
War, or whatever) may in fact have shifted into a sort of hyperbolic mode of expression without any
15 FPK - First People of Kalahari
16 In Tswana linguistic custom, Motswana is the common noun predicable of all persons who are citizens of the country
Botswana. Most will speak the language Setswana, and in the plural people of Tswana origin are called Batswana.
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fundamental change in the logic of the concept in question. Never the less, nations still occupy
most of the land surface of the planet. They still enter into, maintain, and extend relations with other
nations through more or less credible multilateral arrangements (for example, the credibility of
British Commonwealth membership may not be the same as membership of, say, the OECD; each
organization nonetheless has clout in its more or less restricted sphere of influence, and members do
well not to sniff at this). The exaggerated individuality assigned to collectives in post-modem theory
applies as much to nations as to cultures and communities: all that has changed is that there are more
entities that may occupy the state of nature than the nations and economic classes of classical
modernity. The system of organizing social and individual preference rankings in classical
modernity exploited easily understandable choices like peace and war, on the one hand, and
habitually understood choosers like industrial classes and individuals on the other. That is: choices
were usually made between two understandable alternatives offered to two or more choosers
between them. Under these conditions, a cycling majority is not possible, and the Impossibility
Theorem is effectively bypassed (Arrow, 1951: 46-48).
However, the post(hyper)modern environment of political, social and economic choice not only
ensures the plurality of choosers necessary for a cycling majority, it practically guarantees a
sufficiently diverse range of existing cultural and social goods, unevenly distributed, between which
any regional or local society might be required to choose. In other words, the concept of
development must somehow accommodate both the permanent possibility of cycling majorities if it
is to meet the norm of democracy; and deal with the many, if not indefinitely so, ways that functions
might be imposed or dictated in breaking the cycles. Media and civil society as major elements of
the communication aspect of development are, naturally, by no means exempt from this condition.
Clearly, the presence of a plurality of single-issue NGOs, news services, news media, and even
entertainment media, further adds to the possibility that those involved with development are likely
to have an increasingly difficult task distinguishing the wood from the trees .
In the case of the Sami in Norway, certain issues close to Greenpeace (the effect of the
Alta /Kautokeino dam on salmon spawning, for example) were effectively irrelevant as far as the
Sami were concerned. By contrast, issues close to the CKGR SanBushmen are effectively irrelevant
in terms of the Botswana Government's interpretation of its own constitution. Yet neither locally
irrelevant issue will go away; their irrelevancy is practical and not logical, in that the former
qualifier refers to issues of immediate concern, whereas the latter applies to reasoning that stands or
falls with the test of reality in the long run (see Peirce, 8.12). However, the additional influence of
general-issue conventions governed by multilateral bodies, whether social, economic, or political,
may act to stabilise the process ofjormulating alternatives proper to given local or regional
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development. The parties faced with the task of introducing new institutions, services, policies,
practices, and commodities, are effectively designing a quasi-ordering; indeed, they are offering to
impose a method of summing up the preferences expressed by those party to the implementation of a
new basket of goods (social, political, economic, cultural, or otherwise). At the same time, and here
is where the presence of single-issue movements can complicate matters, there will be much
communicational activity (not to mention activism) aimed at raising to prominence the quasi-
ordering of singular participants, whether individual persons, communities, cultures, or other
relevantly associated groups. This activity has the possibility of leading to the summation of
preferences being dictated, at the expense of other preferences or indifference. Logically speaking,
the preference ordering of the CKGR communities, as a single-issue campaign, may readily be
interpreted as a potentially dictated quasi-ordering in relation to the broader policies and projects of
the State; the absence of a relevant statutory foundation in a ratified convention essentially renders
this issue irrelevant at worst, or at best a matter of State indifference. In the following section, I
relate the foregoing to the specific topic of how development theories may give rise to irrelevant
demands, and whether the nominalistic custom of treating development needs as single-issue
problems hampers development instead of facilitating it.
IX. On the Conditions of Development and the Logic of Impossibility.
It is entirely reasonable to expect of development programmes that they meet the needs of the
broadest possible constituency of beneficiaries. Indeed, it would not be too much to say that the
principal criticism of development theory, diffusion theory , development communication theory, and
other related subjects, is that they provide insufficient guidance as to how development should be
structured to meet the needs of all (see, for example, Melkote and Steeves, 2001 : 332-334). An
element of this criticism, then, has comprised various analyses of shortcomings in reigning concepts
of democracy as this has been used in diverse ways to specify how development needs should be
assessed and their fulfilment carried out. Early theory tended to attract the criticism that theories
took specific models of representative government too much for granted; in general, given the
prominence of US power in the post-1945 era of national liberation struggles and subsequent
programmes for Third World development, critics have noted that the US model of two-party
government frequently does not serve the development needs of newly-independent states (Melkote
and Steeves, 2001: 6; Servaes, 1999: 22). In response, various variations on the theme of
participatory democracy have been mooted as more relevant systems for developing nations, often
on the grounds that local custom and tradition are informal versions of this model, anyway (Kerr,
2001 ; see also Donnelly, 200 I).
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However, one could equally validly argue that such participatory models require considerable
sophistication on the part of electorates, and that such capacities are not present in newly-liberated
societies. In the present thesis I duck this issue by considering not specific models, but seeing the
extent to which the matters considered above may be applicable in the cases reviewed, by applying
as criteria the conditions for free choice that Arrow outlined for his analysis of social choice in
modem nations. This is justifiable mainly because there is no logical contradiction involved in
seeing development as a species of welfare implementation subject to the same constraints discussed
above. Thus, the five conditions that Arrow imposed on the environment of choice could be
considered as a reasonable set of touchstones for assessing both the formulation and the
implementation of development strategies and projects. I have already discussed the two conditions
that tend to define the impossibility of strictly individualistic choice models, those of non-
dictatorship and non-imposition, and how readily these can logically be violated in practice. In
context, they are ranked among the other three conditions defining the freedom of choice for social
welfare functions as follows:
Condition 1: Sometimes labelled the' condition of unrestricted scope', this merely states that any
social welfare function should aggregate some sufficiently wide range of three or more
permissible individual preference rankings into a true social ordering (Arrow, 1951: 23-24).
Condition 2: The condition of Positive Association of Social and Individual Values: if one
alternative social ranking rises or does not change in the preference ordering of individuals, then
the same alternative should not fall in the corresponding social ordering after implementation of
the welfare (here, development) function (Arrow, 1951: 25-26).
Condition 3: The condition of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: we shall not permit an
alternative social state to include alternatives not already in the environment of choice before
choosing occurs (Arrow, 1951: 26-28). The most common example used for illustrating this
condition is that of the election candidate who dies or is otherwise incapacitated before the result
of an election is announced; the dead candidate necessarily must be treated as irrelevant, so that
voters' preference rankings without the deceased candidate must remain the same when
aggregated into a social choice.
I have already covered Conditions 4 and 5, and merely repeat them here under the headings Arrow
used in his discussion.
Condition 4: The condition of Citizens' Sovereignty: this is the condition, based the definition
reproduced in note 7 above , that a social welfare function is not to be imposed (Arrow, 1951: 28-
30).
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Condition 5: The condition of Non-Dictatorship: this is derived from the definition reproduced in
note 8 above (Arrow, 1951: 30-31).
Each condition considered separately is highly reasonable from the point of view of the minimal
requirements for a democratic state, albeit restricted to libertarian models. Using majority voting as
the means of aggregating citizen preferences into a Social Welfare Function (SWF) , however,
although each condition "looks innocuous enough, ... taken together they seem to produce a monster
that gobbles up all the little SWFs in the world" (Sen, 1979: 38).
It can readily be seen that Condition 1 does not hold in environments where fewer than three
preferences are offered. A two-party system in which two choices of policy or social good are
offered cannot yield a cycling majority, and therefore conditions 2-5 will be met without dictatorship
or imposition. In other words , the classical US system (electoral college, party primaries and all) is
inherently stable, if somewhat restricted in how social goods are to be construed; welfare debate
readily descends to either-or rhetoric at the expense of potentially more viable alternatives for which
no party exists. Any such alternative will only enter the environment of choice at the expense of an
already institutionalised welfare system. Similarly, the appearance of a third choice that garners
enough support to establish a third party and three options that can be ranked , destabilises the
system. There is still much that is likely to be written and said about how Ralph Nader's)7candidacy
affected the outcome of the 1999 Presidential election.
In other contexts, however, and very particularly in the developing world where multi-party
proportional-representation systems are the norm, more than two choosers (in the form of party
memberships acting as voting blocs) and more than three options are invariably available.
Development goals, conceived as social goods to be adopted by choosing from an ordered ranking of
alternatives, become subject to one or more of the following unstable outcomes: (1) cycling; (2)
stasis through indifference to imposition; and/or (3) one-party rule as a dictated function finds favour
with a majority. So far, the present thesis has described two fundamentally distinct examples of how
states have accommodated, on the one hand, and effectively ignored on the other, an indigenous
minority under their constitutional jurisdiction. I have also reviewed in outline, some of the relevant
theoretical approaches to the kinds of media and communication tasks that researchers consider
relevant to the business of development in contexts where indigenous minorities are present. To
bring these two parts in relation to each other, I have drawn on the problem faced in an environment
of social welfare choice - that is, the logical paradox stated in Arrow's Impossibility Theorem - to
suggest that development communication theory and practice must confront this paradox in order to
17 Fonner administration act ivist in USA , who formed an independent political party in the presidential elections of 1999
and 2003. Well known for interventions on consumer issues in the 1960s and 1970s.
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have any confidence of accomplishing their ends in a non-dictatorial manner at least. I now
conclude with a preliminary sketch of how these considerations apply to the situations covered
earlier.
(1) The Sarni experience of attaining to cultural-political autonomy within the ambit of the
Norwegian state indicates that minorities might best accomplish this sort of end if they can link their
needs to some wider issue that is independent of their specific situation. In this particular case, the
attempt by Greenpeace to impose on the Sami campaign the environmental dispute over the
Alta/Kautokeino dam's effect on salmon spawning would effectively have introduced an irrelevant
alternati ve into their autonomy campaign. By the same token, had Sami activists adopted some or
other Greenpeace issue, they would have imposed an irrelevant alternative onto whatever processes
were already underway between themselves and the Oslo government; from the latter's viewpoint, it
would not be too much too say that the unprecedented adoption of the salmon spawning issue by
Sami negotiators and activists would have effectively meant that a Greenpeace quasi-ordering had
come to dictate any possible autonomy dispensation (if, of course, the latter is construed as a social
good in Arrow 's sense). However, the mobilization of cultural issues like the rock-paintings that the
dam 's waters would have covered, is readily interpretable as a relevant good, and thus not in
violation of Condition 3; in this matter , then, the publicity and communication capacity of
Greenpeace made a positive contribution, albeit not one that would arguably have been decisive in
the long run.
The Kalahari SanBushmen, quite literally, have no comparable issue to mobilize in support of their
cause. The media and advocacy campaign of Survival International does not place the Botswana
government under any political obligation to respond in any way at all: they have not ratified the
relevant convention, and hence are not obliged to act. In effect, this leaves the Kalahari community
in a kind of limbo. On the one hand, they have experienced a certain level of international academic
and development support, and have some precedent in appealing to outside agencies (as, for
example, Komtsha did in appealing to Elizabeth II in a manner proper to Botswana's pre-
independence status as a British protectorate). On the other hand, these forms of support have been
informed by what might best be called 'mythical' conceptions of Bushman identity, the perception of
the community as a people trapped in time (see, for example, Tomaselli, 1996, for a critical review
of these perceptions). As such, their condition leaves them caught between having to abandon what
the outside world treats as their most characteristic identity mark, and preserving this identity at the
expense of participation in the social goods available to other communities. When an organization
like Survival assumes an advocacy role on the part of this community, therefore, it must give
primacy to those elements of Bushman identity that put a heavy burden of coordination on other
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prospective development beneficiaries who are not part of the SanBushmen community, while
actively shielding the latter from sacrificing their perceived uniqueness through the adoption of
innovative social goods. In other words, the SanBushmen only benefit from development in so far as
they do not benefit from it. This is sufficiently illogical not even to register as a dictated social
welfare function, let alone an incomplete or insufficient one. It is a choice that practically violates
all Arrow 's conditions.
(2) The dilemma that the CKGR SanBushmen face actually has little in common with the situation in
which the Sami were able to treat their autonomy as a viable social welfare alternative. Possibly the
most glaring difference between their respective conditions is the lack of precedent: Bushmen have
no record of coordination with any state upon which to draw, other than some limited operational
alliances with South Africa's apartheid military in Angola (Godwin, P. 2000); the Sami could, at the
very least, draw on the relatively recent experience of coordination in combat with the Norwegian
anti-Nazi resistance. The longer history of Sami coordination in Norway's elective politics simply
reinforces the precedents of any other coordination relationships that may have been forged. The
Sami situation, therefore, permitted their autonomy campaign to include continued coordination with
Oslo as an option, such that this condition would have remained an element of people 's ordering
after any prospective autonomy resolution. In other words, Sami cultural autonomy would not have
violated Arrow's Condition 2. For the Kalahari communities and the Botswana state, on the other
hand, any prospective coordination would effectively be an innovation, sufficiently radical to disturb
the preference orderings of at least those Motswana who would be called upon to rank such
coordination as an option. Effectively, this is interpretable as a change that would violate Condition
2, because to add this alternative to people 's existing ordering is to change that ordering. Another
strategy is therefore necessary, which, naturally , is likely to violate either Condition 4 or Condition
5, if not both.
(3) The Botswana government is in the interesting situation that they have no option but to consider
any form of targeted development, whether benefiting the SanBushmen or any other minority
(indigenous or otherwise) , as an irrelevant alternative that violates Condition 3. Were government
analysts to recognize this, however, they would also have to acknowledge their failure to coordinate
with other nations constitutes an individual quasi-ordering that defines what preferences other
nations ought to hold; that is to say, to acknowledge Bushmen's development as violating Condition
3 requires that the Botswana government violate Condition 5. They are effectively dictating an
indigenous-minority welfare function to the international community.
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x. Conclusion.
Analysing development communication by conceiving' development' as a species of social and
cultural good institutionalised through a welfare function, pennits one to proceed from the logical
basis of Arrow 's Theorem. This has the added advantage that Arrow (1951: 21) explicitly
acknowledged the philosophical doctrine ofNominalism as the basis for modem conceptions of
society, welfare, and community. Since the post-modem paradigm is itself in practice radically
nominalist, therefore, there seems to be no reason for excluding Arrow 's somewhat disconcerting
conclusion from consideration when confronting Africa 's generally disappointing experience of
development since the first wave of independence in the 1950s. It was Arnold Shepperson, who is
exploring features of Arrow 's deduction that show a remarkable parallel with the logical work of
C.S. Peirce , who suggested the logically persuasive isomorphism of the process of development
implementation with the process of social welfare choices. There is some risk in having followed
this line of analysis , of course, because the development communication literature has no references
to Arrow. It may be too easy, for example, to accept Arrow 's five conditions without asking if these
do not reflect too much of a bias in favour of American political ideals. But, as we developed the
analysis of a mountain of development theory it became clear that the often fractiously contradictory
positions taken by theorists frequently reflect norms that by no means depart from Arrow.
Thus the contemporary focus on the necessity for establishing and nurturing participatory practices
in development quite reasonably follow from Arrow's Conditions 2 and 4, that is, of the positive
association of individual and social values, and of citizens' sovereignty, respectively. The Sami
experience, by the same token, has shown some reason to accept as valid Condition 3, the
independence of irrelevant alternatives. It was somewhat surprising, therefore, to discover that the
attitude of the Botswana government in respect of SanBushmen development needs , can also be
logically described in terms of Arrow's conditions: a state that is not signatory to some international
or multilateral convention, agreement, or protocol is logically indifferent to the issue the relevant
agreement covers. There is no violation of Condition 3 if the Botswana government chooses to
ignore the SanBushmen development problem; but this is accomplished at the price of violating
Condition 4.
An odd outcome of the present analysis has been that Arrow 'sfive original (1951) conditions seem
to work better in the broader context of development, than the four he proposed in the second edition
of his classic (1963) . It is clear when viewing the original conditions 2 and 4 together, that they
represent a weakened version of the Pareto Principle (which essentially states that if everybody
prefers some x to some y , then x is to be chosen - or y excluded - as a social decision). Even these
reduced conditions still conclude with the Impossibility Result. As Sen (1982 : 288-290) has noted,
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however, attempts to weaken this and other conditions, particularly 3 and 4 enumerated above,
often lead to even more outlandish results that defy any attempt at fitting them into anything
remotely resembling a modem democratic dispensation. It would appear that keeping the original
conditions 2 and 4 instead of combining them into the weakened Pareto Principle accommodates the
logical status of agencies that fall outside of the classes, individuals, and states that comprise the
actors in classical welfare economics. Especially in respect of the relations between states and
indigenous minorities, the role of civil-society and non-governmental participants can be understood
as influencing the preferences of minority groupings generally. However, because such bodies are
generally constituted around single issues instead of a more or less complete basket of welfare
goods, there are two possible outcomes that are best analysed under Arrow's original second and
fourth conditions :
I) whether, for a development-welfare organization A that advocates around any given issue Xi in
relation to a minority M, contradictions might arise if other organizations AI,A", .. . and so on,
advocate single-issue alternatives y, z, and so on in the same environment of choice; and
2) whether such situations as encountered in practice in contexts like, amongst others, Mozambique,
Papua New Guinea , the Balkans, and East Timor, also exhibit the logical properties I have elaborated
above.
There seems , therefore, to be some value for the development sector in adopting Arrow 's Theorem
as a touchstone for assessing providers' and facilitators' qualitative compliance with norms of
democratic practice in the broad modem constitutional sense common among developing nations.
At the same time, however, the logical consequence of these proportional multiparty systems is the
permanent possibility for cycling majorities to occur in the aggregation of social choices; in respect
of development, Arrow's conclusion that this paradox is only avoided by imposing or dictating a
summation of preferences has to be confronted. That a given grouping within a community - like
the Sami Reindeer Herders' association, for example, or the group associated with Bushman leader
Dawid Kruiper in South Africa (McLennan-Dodd 2003: 29) - may appropriate to itself the role of
the 'public face' of all members of an indigenous minority, should also be analysed through the lens
of the Impossibility Theorem. To close , then, I would suggest that development advocates and
activists consider it an imperative that dictated functions be treated as unacceptable, in line with any
form of democratic practice. On the other hand, and this was the most unexpected conclusion
reached, it may be best that the civil society sector accept that development goals, as social goods
introduced as innovations in previously marginal societies, can only be institutionalised by
imposition. A marginal community towards whom a state is indifferent, may therefore benefit more
directly from solutions imposed more explicitly for the benefit of other communities. This is,
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simply, because their marginal status renders their needs as irrelevant alternatives in the overall
ordering of government preferences (perceived as violating Condition 3). On the other hand, some
measure of coordination between their interests and those oftheir neighbours is easier to accomplish,
in so far as these neighbours ' interests have a presence on the state 's radar screen. The task for the
development agencies , then, is to assist those closest to all the communities in a given environment
of choice, to facilitate adoption of innovations within the most marginal communities, and
ameliorate the disruption such innovation necessarily brings. Put differently: a dictated solution
entails a single community's interest being elevated to the status of determining what will be the
interest of all; an imposed solution has the potential at least to account for a range of interests, even
if not immediately satisfying anyone of them completely:
If we are to live our lives in peace and harmony, and if we are to achieve our ambition of
improving the conditions under which we live, we must have both freedom and discipline. For





Tape l. Interview, Kukama Village. (Names of the respondents withheld to protect their identity).
Tape 2. Interview, Molopo Village. (Names of the respondents withheld to protect their identity).
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Appendix 1. The Komtsha Komtsha letter to the Queen of England
Her Highness,
The Queen of England,
England.
Dear Great Queen,
My name is Komtsha. I am an old man. I am a Bushman. If we are too small, or if you have forgotten, you
must ask other people what a Bushman is and where they live.
When I saw a man from England, I asked him to give message to you. It is the message of our pain and
suffering. The [Tswana] people are stealing the land from my people. I must answer my people. I say I do not
know why they [the Tswana] can come and do so. The Great Woman from England will know. She will know
the truth.
Not very long ago you gave the Tswana people their land [at independence in 1966]. At that time when you
came here what did you see? Were there only trees and black people here? Is that why you did not talk to us?
The Tswana people think you have given us to them. They do not understand you did not see us and that is a
mistake.
If you did not give us to them, then you must tell them now that they must let us go. They are killing our land.
They do not understand the animals or the land. They are wasting everything and soon nobody will be able to
live. We have always lived with the animals. They are our friends. The Tswana people are chasing us away
from the animals.
You must not answer the Tswana people. This is my word to you. You must send your word to me.
I must first see your answer before we can talk to the Tswana people.
Please do not wait too long,
Komtsha Komtsha
This letter was written by one of the leaders of the Central Kalahari Bushmen. It was never delivered
to the Queen and was published for the first time in Africa Reports, 29th April 2005 (Bridgland, 2005)
with the heading " Bushmen to be Denied Homeland" According to this article, Komtsha was unable
to persuade anyone to deliver the letter before he died. During our journey through the CKGR, it was
more than one time we heard about letters written to the Queen of England.
Appendix 2a. 24 Feb 2005 article on Kenneth Good in Mmegi.
Thursday 24 February 2005
(http ://w w w .m m eg i .bw / 200 5 / February / Thursday 24/5978 74 22210 60 .h t m l)
Hero's welcome as Good delivers paper
MAUREEN ODUBENG
Staff Writer
2/24/20054:11:28 PM (GMT +2)
Professor Kenneth Good, University of Botswana's political science lecturer who
was declared a prohibited immigrant last Friday, delivered his paper on
presidential succession in Botswana to a packed audience yesterday afternoon.
Before Good appeared at the University of Botswana lecture hall, there was
anxiety whether he would make it after spending the morning at the Lobatse
High Court where he is fighting his deporation.
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His lawyers successfully applied for his case to be
postponed to today. With speculation that he was
declared a prohibited imm igrant because of the paper he
co-authored with fellow academic Dr Ian Taylor, the
crowd that turned out for the sem inar was so huge that
the event had to be moved to a bigger lecture hall. By
2pm it was obv ious that the original venue - Room
240/285 - was too small for the crowd attending a
lecture meant to start two hours later.
Interestingly, there were a good number of MPs,
politicians across the political div ide, lecturers and
students. When Good walked into the fultv packed
lecture hall , he was given a hero 's welcome, mostly by
his students.
The students had defin itely reached their conclusion about the reasons behind Good's
deportation order - his cr it icism of the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) and
government. The public has been left to speculate since the reasons for the deportation
order have not been given.
The students and for most part the crowd at the seminar shared sentiments that the
deportation is unfair and proves that "Botswana is moving towards authoritarianism".
Good started his presentation by declaring that he is not a member of any political party
in Botswana or anywhere else. He said he is a believer in criticism and quoted other
critics who said, " silence is a threat to democracy". He said there is no model for
transition in Botswana , add ing that it is too flawed and complicated. He said problems in
Botswana's democracy are shown by a number of factors which include the historical and
cultural background of the country. He explained that wealth and power co-exist in a
culturally legitimate inter-relationship in Botswana. He added that leadership in the
country has been associated with wealth. He said colonial masters were comfortable
leaving power in the then newly formed Botswana Democratic Party (BOP), with the
belief that wealth shows responsibility.
"It is important that Tswana elites are historically distinctive from most others in Africa in
their direct engagement in production, and in their being individual accumulators of
wealth before-as well as during-their succession to high," Good and Taylor said in their
paper. The two academics said the constitutional and political power is highly centralised
on the executive. The paper attacked the founding president, the late Sir Seretse Khama,
saying he did not like democracy, as he changed the constitution to suit his interests.
They said that when former pres ident, Ketumile Masire lost elections twice in Kanye,
Khama changed the constitution to get him to Parliament. The paper pointed out that
BOP presidents have always manipulated the country's constitution to best suit their
personal interests.
They accuse President Festus Mogae of failing to solve factionalism in the BOP and
conclusions have been reached that he manipulated the constitution and favoured the
inexperienced Vice President Ian Khama, by getting him elected into office, so that he
could help him with the party problems.
Good said the country is definitely marching towards authoritarianism and automatic
succession is out- dated and is not good for the people . After the presentation, the first
to ask a question was the executive secretary of the BOP Dr.Comma Serema. He tried to
discredit Good's presentation on the basis that his research is based on media reports,
which are not always a true reflection of the real situation. Good replied that he relied on
other sources and not just newspaper reports alone. Serema however met a lot of
criticism from Good's supporters.
One person asked Good why the paper he presented is not balanced. He sought to know
why the presentation lacked academic evidence, including the advantages and
disadvantages of automatic succession.
However, all the students seemed in agreement that the country was moving towards
authoritarianism.
One student termed the possible deportation of Good as a threat to freedom of
expression . She said if the trend continues, the future of social scientists in the country is
threatened because they will not engage in free criticism of government in fear of
vict im isation . .
"This is not a good platform for political scientists of tomorrow," she said.
A good number of students who stood up to ask questions were in support of Good and
Taylor's arguments.
53
Appendix 2b. 24 Feb 2005 article on Kenneth Good in Mmegi.
Mriii'gi
Thursday 24 February 2005
2/24/20054:10:13 PM (GMT +2)
Yesterday, PROF. KENNETH GOOD presented his critical analysis of Botswana's
democracy to a packed audience at the University of Botswana. Below is an
abridged version of the paper
What democracy?
The dynamics of Botswana's celebrated democracy must be investigated if the idea that
the country represents a model of presidential transitions in Africa is to be properly
assessed. The proposition is doubtful primarily on the basis that the country's
democracy is highly elitist, power is centralized in the pres idency, and the country's two
presidential transitions, in 1980 and 1998, both took place without reference to the
wishes of the people, determined by very few, and involved successors who had no
popular constituencies whatsoever.
Impermanency in high office is a fundamental democratic principle. In the participatory
form of democracy that existed in all reality for two centuries in Athens, where popular
organisation and equality were paramount, a "president for a day" held office and the
position circulated widely among the cit izenry. In the participatory aspirations of the
United Democratic Front in South Africa in the 1980s, principles of "organizational
democracy" were developed to try to achieve, against destructive odds, collective
leadersh ip, frequently re-elected. The criticism of leaders-notably of the touted Mother
of the Nation, Madikizela-Mandela--their accountability, and their reporting back to the
membership on the fulfilment or otherwise of the mandates entrusted to them, was
someth ing that was striven for.
Liberal democracies however are built in sharp distinction on elitism and nourish
inequa lities. But even the United States ensures that a "Mister President" serves at
most two four-year terms of office, and assumes the replaceability of even the most
celebrated. Liberal elitism entails the circulation of elites, the concomitant of
competition. Margaret Thatcher in Britain became known as the Iron Lady, and even
constructed a new ruling ideology in her own name. She won re-election three times,
but her end was swift and rather total. Public pre-eminence for ten years was
succeeded by anonymity and silence, outside the House of Lords and the American
lecture circu it.
As is well known, permanency of tenure and the absolute reluctance by most presidents
to voluntarily hand over power - even after losing elections - is a striking feature of
Africa. Presidentialism and c1ientelism stake out the continent's politics. Widespread
networks of clients receive services and resources in return for support. This is well
understood and even expected in many African countries.
Crucially, resource extracted from the state or the economy in this c1ientelism are
deployed as the means to maintain support and legitimacy in the political system, with
the concomitant effect that the control of the state is equivalent to the control of
resources, which in turn is crucial for remaining a Big Man. Control of the state serves
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the twin purposes of lubricating patronage networks and satisfies the selfish desire of
elites to self-enrich themselves, in many cases, in a quite spectacular fashion. That lies
at the heart of the profound reluctance by African presidents to hand over power
voluntarily and why very many African regimes end messily, sometimes in coups. In
most cases, the democratic option is either absent or is not respected by the loser. The
stakes simply are too high as once one is out of the loop vis-a-vis access to state
resources, the continuation of one's status as a Big Man and the ability to enrich
oneself becomes virtually impossible. Politics in Africa thus tends to be a zero-sum
game. As of the time of writing and nearly fifteen years after the democratisation wave
supposedly washed over Africa as the Cold War ended, 39 per cent of Africa's rulers
have been in power for over ten years, whilst 28 per cent have been presidents for
fifteen years or more. A resilient 19 per cent have sat on the throne of power for
twenty years or more whilst three have been heads of state for over thirty years.
Encouraging Africa's Big Men to relinquish power is imperative, but if Botswana offers
lessons, they are of a restricted and limited nature.
Botswana is indeed exceptional, but it is so in ways more complex and restricted than
its uncritical admirers have realised. It is important that Tswana elites are historically
distinctive from most others in Africa in their direct engagement in production, and in
their being individual accumulators of wealth before - as well as during - their
succession to high office. Wealth and power co-exist in a culturally legitimate inter-
relationship in Botswana. Other factors are also at work today. An obvious one is that
constitutional and political power is highly centralized in the executive and the person
of the state President, who has also been the president of the ruling Botswana
Democratic Party (BDP). Additionally, the president of Botswana is not directly elected
by the people and constitutionally he decides alone. He need consult no one in making
a decision, not cabinet, Vice-President or party caucus. Through the Office of the
President he has direct control over important levers of power; the military and police,
the public service, the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC), and
Information and Broadcasting (encompassing the country's major daily newspaper -
distributed free and nation-wide - plus Radio Botswana and Botswana Televlslon). The
president can constitute a commission of inquiry into any matter, determine whether it
sits in public or in private, and whether their report is made public or not. The flow of
opinion is carefully controlled in this democracy. Public servants are prohibited from
speaking to the press, there is no Freedom of Information, and no whistleblower laws
exist for the protection of an ethically minded bureaucrat. Rather the opposite. A
leading minister told parliament in 1995 that an "erring" official who gave information
to an opposition MP about corruption in the Central Transport Organization would be
traced and charged under the National Security and Public Service Acts.
When a series of scandals occurred involving senior ministers and the President in the
early 1990s, President Masire responded in part by tightening controls further. A
number of parastatals introduced punitive confidence laws to restrict the availability of
information to the public.
The National Security Act symbolises the secretive and authoritarian tendencies within
the state. It provides for imprisonment of up to 25 years regardless of public interest in
the matter in hand, and its provisions are both vague and sweeping.
Secrecy and non-accountability is pervasive. For instance, the government initiated a
very large military expansion programme in the early 1990s, characterised by a failure
to explain, justify and account. It got underway with the construction of the large
Thebephatshwa Airbase west of Gaborone, officially opened in 1995. Seven months
later, reports appeared in the Netherlands and the local press that Botswana was
seeking to purchase 50 Leopard i-V battle tanks. Asked for clarification, the BDF's only
response was that "the information is classified". While lengthy debate took place in
Holland over the proposed sale to a small developing country, the National Assembly in
Gaborone failed to discuss the matter. Even a parliamentary question was ruled out of
order; the Minister for Presidential Affairs, Ponatshego Kedikilwe, told the deputy leader
of the opposition that it was "unacceptable ... to expect me to reveal such sensitive
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information".
The expansion, and the secrecy surrounding the military, goes on. German laws against
the export of its military equipment outside the NATO area had stymied the initial
purchase of the Leopards, but newspaper reports in July 2001 indicated that Botswana
had succeeded in purchasing 20 tanks from Austria, and that some or all of these had
already arrived the previous year. The cost to Botswana, an Austrian diplomat based in
Pretoria confirmed, was S32.5 million. An option for a further purchase existed. A BDF
spokesman would neither confirm nor deny the report. By 2001 the outlay on the
military in Botswana still represented 3.5 per cent of GDP, again greater than its
neighbours.
This was significant in the specific sense that military expansion in the face of no known
enemy could promote regional de-stabilisation, and constitute also a weakening of the
country's proclaimed reputation for economic and political rationality . But it was
significant also in the broad and general sense. Secrecy is a preserve of ruling elites,
and it stands in sharp opposition to democracy. Information helps to empower people,
while secrecy weakens them. The Ombudsman, Lethebe Maine, called for the
enactment of a Freedom of Information Act in late 1999. Fulsome words about the
Ombudsman as a pillar of democracy meant very little, he said, unless the right to
complain and raise issues was fully available to all sectors of the public.
Access to information is tightly controlled because it supports stability and the status
quo in liberal Botswana. Even questioners are summarily dismissed, and may be
portrayed as "abusive", as "breeding a culture of contempt", or of being involved in "a
witch-hunt" if they endeavour to persist.
The leadersh ip of the democratic government, like more authoritarian counterparts
elsewhere in Africa, does not readily engage with criticism. In April 2001 the Botswana
Ombudsman took notice of the fact that Vice-President Khama had participated in BDP
election meetings accompanied by publ ic officers. He found that th is practice was not
only "against the spirit" of General Order 38 of the Public Service Act, but that it also
"g ives the perception that such public officers are furthering the interests of [the ruling
party]". He recommended that President Mogae "issue a new directive to all public
officers" in the light of these concepts. The Vice-President also had a practice of
arriving at BDP meeting in a BDF helicopter piloted by himself. One issue here, noted in
the media, was the possible impact of such an arrival on rural voters in the governing
party's heartland and Khama's home-base in Central District, and another concerned
the fact that as a civil ian, the Vice-President was no longer covered by the provisions of
the Botswana Defence Act regarding offences relating to property . He was neither
authorised by the Act, nor could he be disciplined by the Commander of the BDF in the
event of loss or accident. The Ombudsman concluded that only persons subject to the
Act can properly be authorised to use service property and recommended that the
President brings to the attention of the Vice-President "the inadVisability of personally
flying [BDF] aircraft".
Criticism here touched on substantive aspects of the powers and prerogatives of the
ruling elite, but the Ombudsman's findings were deflected, apparently ignored. The
Permanent Secretary to the President, Molosiwa Selepeng, said later that President
Mogae had authorised the Vice-Pres ident to f ly BDF aircraft, and that Mogae's act ion
was in Selepeng's view, perfectly lawful.
Commanding both the state and the predominant party, all three presidents to-date
have readily exercised their powers. Seretse Khama, we are told by his biographers,
had never been really happy "in the rough -and-tumble of constituency politics and
parliamentary debate", so the constitution was changed, as early as October 1972, to
accommodate the indirect election of the president "the first step on the way to
autocracy". Ketumile Masire surprised and opposed his BDP ministers when he publicly
and arbitrarily announced his support for lowering the voting age to 18 - many senior
colleagues saw youths as SUbordinates, dangerously volatile and irresponsible - and
much the same occurred when he announced his retirement. Festus Mogae made a
number of personal, seemingly ever secret decisions, favouring the inexperienced Lt.
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General Ian Khama, eldest son of Seretse, as his Vice President - his initial
appointment, his deputy's almost immediate, unprecedented "sabbatical" leave, and
Khama's continued piloting of BDF aircraft against the express recommendations of the
Ombudsman. The latter step expressed the presumption that he and the Vice-President
were above the law. During the October 2004 elections Mogae publicly announced three
times that, if parl iament rejected his re-nom ination of Khama as his deputy, and thus
heir apparent, he would dissolve parliament. In other words, a president without any
popular constituency would dismiss the newly elected legislature. He supposedly
backed up this threat by declaring his personal assurances that Khama did not have the
authoritarian intentions that even BDP members, on good evidence, suspected him of
holding.
Presidential arrogance is repeatedly displayed in the immediate re-appointment of BDP
MPs and ministers rejected democratically by their constituencies. The appointment of
(four) so-called Specially Elected Members of parliament was a constitutional provision
intended to assist weak communities to gain representation, but the provision was
"blatantly used" for getting ruling party members back into parliament against the
wishes of their constituents.
This practice is a norm in Botswana politics. In October 2004 , Margaret Nasha, an old
BDP stalwart, was kicked out by her Gaborone Centra l constituents, only to be
immediately returned to parliament, and to her Ministry of Local Government, by
Mogae-again, in direct contradiction of the wishes of the electorate. These presidential
prerogatives, it must be recognised, were used by Masire in the 1990s to see able
young professional women, such as Joy Phumaphi, uplifted into Parliament and cabinet-
so improving the BDP's modernising, meritocratic image - but no trade unionist or
representative of subordinate ethnic minorities, for example, have ever been so
favoured .
The dom inance of nomination over election is extensive. In November 2004 Nasha
announced the names of nominated councillors. Out of 101 nominated local
government councillors" only three came from the oppos ition. Given that the BDP
gained 52 percent of the popular vote while the opposition accounted for 48 percent,
the nominations were described by the press as "a monstrosity".
There seems to be a growing call to avoid a repeat of the Masire-Mogae transition.
Some prominent party officials now openly call for the president of the BDP to be
directly elected. Botswana on the evidence is a poor model for African presidential
transitions. As the Vice-President under Masire, and when he was the head of the
Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, Mogae declared, in December 1997,
that it was t ime to stop blaming colon ialism, when it was the polic ies of the new leaders
which were responsible for Africa's current predicaments. The following June, soon after
becom ing President, he said in Burkina Faso, that autocrats who oppress their own
people should be barred from high office in the Organization of African Unity. It was
Mogae too who pushed for the establishment of the DCEC (with its investigatory
strengths, but its prosecutionary powers in the hands, of course, of the President) ,
saying that corruption was a serious problem requiring serious solutions.
Mogae as President in immediate tandem with Khama seems a less rational,
principled and perspicacious person. The President and his deputy are essentially two
managers, not politicians - one a financial bureaucrat and the other a soldier. They
believe, to a varying extent, in control and loyalty, rather than performance, discussion
and pr inciple. The temperament and actions of the latter in particular are autocratic
and prone to order-giving, rather than debate and argument, "the stuff of democracy".
The recent decis ion to ignore a government task-force's strong recommendations for
the country's second university to be sited in Selebi -Phikwe, and instead locate it in
Serowe, something of a dorpie by comparison but Khama's fiefdom, is seen by many as
a portent of th ings to come : favouritism and the overruling of law, professionalism and
procedure in the service of personal agendas. Ian Khama had earlier announced that he
expected his younger brother, Tshekedi, to inherit his par liamentary seat in Serowe
North West. Even the BDP secretariat expressed objection to such an abrogation of
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democratic procedures. Its executive secretary, Botsalo Ntuane, said that Khama could
have made the statement in jest, and that party primaries chose parliamentary
candidates.
The rising opposition to Khama automatically becoming the next president is partly
fuelled by the fact that President Mogae has been irrationally, privately and secretively,
accommodating of Khama. This began with his appointment to the Vice-Presidency,
extended to his almost immediate sabbatical, and other matters noted already, and
seemingly goes on.
The preference accorded Khama is to a man who has no ministerial job and whose
education credentials are seemingly a secret within the country. Furthermore, Ian
Khama has made no secret of his intense dislike of the compromises of politics and of
his contempt for politicians. Indeed, he has previously attacked members of his own
party as "unprincipled, intolerant, selfish vultures and monkeys". This is the person
who is about to take over the "African miracle".
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Appendix 2e. 16 June article on Kenneth Good in Mmegi.
Mogae's explanation on Good is lacking
Mmi'gi
Thursday 16 June 2005 Vol .22 No.91
WHITHER BOTSWANA?
DAN MOABI
6/16/200511 :35:52 AM (GMT +2 )
"President Festus Mogae says Professor Kenneth Good was deported because
he teamed up with Survival International (51) to sabotage the diamonds for
development campaign."
This is the open ing paragraph of a front-page story in the 13 June 2005 issue of the Daily
News, concerning a press conference given by Mogae on Saturday. A correction appeared
in the next day 's issue of the paper, stating that the statement quoted above was
mislead ing because the reasons for Good's deportation were not raised or divulged
during the pres ident's press conference. The correction further explained that the
comments by Mogae "on Good's efforts to tarnish the international image of Botswana's
diamonds" were made in response to recent press reports that a link between Good and
SI might have been established from two laptops stolen from the professor.
Reporting on the same press conference on the same date as the Daily News, the Monitor
said the president "gave a hint of the reason why he deported the Australian scholar. He
said Good and Brit ish based Survival International director, Stephen Corry, had written
numerous documents in which they described Botswana's diamonds as blood diamonds."
The paper quoted President Mogae as having said of Good: "To his cred it, the man was
open about his campa ign. " It then added: "Given that Botswana's diamonds are the
mainstay of the economy, it appeared from the pres ident's remarks that an attack on the
diamonds was an unpardonable sin for which Good had to go."
It's clear, therefore, that even if the correction made by the Daily News was genuine
(and not imposed on the paper by some government authority) the message conveyed
by the pres ident's remarks was understood in the same way by the two newspapers
quoted above. The Daily News might indeed have overstated the president's remarks,
but the meaning of the Monitor's more subdued interpretat ion of the presidential
comments is no different from that of the government's mouthpiece.
One can, therefore, safely conclude that whatever the reasons for deporting Kenneth
Good were, his alleged collaboration with the government's archenemy, Survival
International, was probably the decisive consideration that persuaded Mogae to declare
him a prohibited immigrant. Unfortunately, it's difficult to verify the president's
allegations aga inst Good because he didn't say precisely what the professor wrote about
the relocation of Basarwa from the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR). I, for one,
find it difficult to believe that Good would try to argue that the relocation was driven by
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the desire to mine diamonds in the reserve. I would be surprised if he did, because he
ought to know better than that. Nevertheless, given the exploration for diamonds that
was carried out in the CKGR some years ago, it should be acknowledged that it is
understandable that some people believe this theory,
But even assuming that Good did write what he's alleged to have written about Botswana
diamonds, would this justify the way the president t reated him? I don't think so, for he's
entitled to his views about it, as about anything else; and those of us who disagree with
him are equally free to put forward our opposing views on the subject. This is the
democratic way of dealing with such issues. However, in the unlikely event that there
were a law that made it an offence to express such views about Botswana diamonds, it
would be a different matter. Even then, however, his deportation would st ill have been
unjustified because the courts would have been able to deal with him. So, whichever way
the government may try to dress -up its actions against Good, the actions remain
intolerable and undemocratic.
Also disappo inting about Mogae's press conference were his allegations that those who
criticise Good's deportation do so because he's a white man. Is the pres ident finding it so
difficult to defend his actions that he has to resort to using racial slurs against his critics?
Unfortunately, this won't work, for I'm sure race is one issue that leaves all the
government's critics on this matter absolutely cold. Indeed, I recall similar criticisms of
previous governments when they deported residents of this country who were not white,
such as Mxol isi Mxlashe , Naz Kader (Who's still in this country) and others. Surprising ly,
the president wondered why the press writes so much about Good when it never writes
anything when his government deports illegal immigrants from Zimbabwe!
Finally, it was wonderful to learn (Monitor) that at his press conference, Mogae
acknowledged that the country's deportation procedures needed to be changed to make




Appendix 3a. 17 June 2005 press release on Kenneth Good by
Survival International.
BOTSWANA: 17 Jun 2005
Botswana's President Mogae has said that he decided to deport Australian Professor Ken Good as a
'threat to national security' over his links with Survival International.
President Mogae described the international concern over the Professor's deportation as a 'big
hullabaloo over the deportation of a single , solitary white man' .
The President has falsely alleged that Good and Survival's Director Stephen Corry have 'written
numerous documents in which they described Botswana's diamonds as blood diamonds.'
Professor Good , who had worked at Botswana University for fifteen years before his deportation,
had both his computers stolen in separate incidents within ten days of each other.
The Botswana newspaper Mmegi reported this week that Mr Mogae ended a recent press conference
by 'volunteering information on a question nobody had asked, [and] denying that his operatives
might have broken into Good's house and stolen his computer.'
In a statement today Professor Good said, 'I have never described Botswana's diamonds as 'blood
diamonds', nor have I ever 'teamed up' with Survival International to sabotage Botswana's 'diamonds
for development' campaign. I have certainly exchanged correspondence with Survival, as I have with
a huge number of academics, journalists, and other NGOs. The only way Mr Mogae would know of




Appendix 3b. 29 July 2005 press release on Kenneth Good by Survival
International.
BOTSWANA : 29 Jul 2005
Australian Professor Kenneth Good , who was deported from Botswana last month as a 'threat to
national security,' over his criticism of Botswana's democracy and his correspondence with Survival ,
lost his appeal in the Botswana courts on July 27.
Professor Good, who has taught political science at the University of Botswana for fifteen years , was
deported from the country on 31 May, and is now in London. He had written and spoken against the
evictions of Bushmen from their ancestral homes in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve
In a recent statement Good said, 'My deportation is another sign that the government of Botswana is
heading in an increasingly autocratic direction. It is a defeat for democracy and free speech .'
Botswana's President Mogae said on BBC TV's Newsnight programme on Monday, '[Professor





Appendix 4. Log Tape 1: Kukama Settlement (translated from Setswana)
Time inn (TC): Kukama settlement
12:33:00 Them: What did the wild life authorities say to you?
us: They did not say much, they just asked if where we were going to pass, which gate. Then
we went in (CKGR).
us: Do you guys often get people passing here and asking you guys questions?
12:34:32 Woman in Red: Not many people come around and ask questions except some
American tourist who come around and ask questions.
us: Have you heard of an organisation called survival international?
12:35:44 Woman in Red: We know some but we don't know others, they all look the same,
they are all white! But we have heard about that organisation.
us: Is this the place were you guys grew up, has you family always been here?
12:36:48 Woman in Red: This is our home, this is our mother and our father was also buried
here and so did our grandparents whose graves are also here . I can just say it's a place
of my ancestors have lived (comments the woman with a green head cloth) . In general
the family history is here.
Us: back in time, has the Botswana government tried to remove you or tried to sabotage your
way of living here.
12:38:24 Them: ever, we have never heard of such a thing, the reason why we are surprised is
because now, it's the very first time we ever hear that we have to move
Us: what reasons did the government give them for moving?
12:39:45 Woman in red: they say we should move for the wild animals, and I don't understand
because our grandparents stayed here with these wild animals and we grew with them
and its just the way of our lives. Now all of a sudden we are told to move.
Us: where are you supposed to move to?
12:41:05 They, (the Government officials) say we should move to New Xadi and Kaudane, but
we don't want our kids to come back to the reserve to see the animals with money
because we don 't. Have the money; we want them to grow up with the privilege of
experiencing to live with the wild animals as we did
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Us: so do you want the life which is outside of the reserve, with TV., schools, hospitals etc.
12:42:15 Them; no, no, no! We really can 't cope being out there , being alcoholics and that 's
what we are not used to here, and people who have gone out there are alcoholics
Us: what about the hospitals that have been built outside the reserve for you?
12:44:05 Them: well if we can still move when we are sick , we'd rather just ride our
donkey's from here and back, but moving, no! -even if you die we die on the way.
Us: so what is this paper on the tree for? (Government sticker in the nearby tree with
information of survey with a plane in low altitude)
12:45:15 Woman in red: Ah, we were just told that an aeroplane will be in the area soon, so we
shouldn't be afraid when we see it
Us: do u guys know what it (the plane) is coming to do here?
12:46: 10 No, we only hear that its here to survey the soil, weather they are looking for
diamonds we don 't know.
Us: Does u know that there are diamonds in the area?
12:47:03 Woman in red: We do not know really, but we are saying that since we are people
who reside here , we deserve to be politely asked and not just be walked upon as if we
are not human. We should be respected, even if they survey and find these diamonds
they should not just take us by storm. The least that can be done is tell us that we
found something in your land and politely step aside, like they would do for every
body. Like u see how you guys came here and asked us politely if u could talk to us,
which was the way, not just coming here to the CKGR forcing cameras in our faces
just because we are Basarwa's. No, that approach doesn't work.
Us: when was the first time u heard that you had to move out from the reserve?
12:48:30 Them: we had water drums here and they are now taken
Us: how does u get water now? (The question started a long section of statements; the following




Please we beg you people as you go around please tell your fellow people about us,
well not the government coz that will just be a death sentence. Please voice our
complaints.
They (the government) has served us with death sentence, I mean when you take
water, medical facilities , it means that even if you die it does not matter. I'm afraid of
saying this.
Our grand parents did not drink water often, only when it rained. Their bodies were
used to that. Even we could have been like that, we don't know what thought the





If I was to give you an example now: If u bring me something today and I eat it and
bring it again tomorrow, I'll get used to it and think this is the person who can help
me live better. That what the government did, he made us get used to water and that a
person got medical facilities and food. Now that we are not getting those things we
are really struggling.
I am surprised by the fact that I used to get pension money from the government and
it suddenly stopped.
They stopped the money in 2002. They don't give the money until she moves out.
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Appendix 5. Log Tape 2: Molapo Settlement
Time Inn (TC): Molapo Settlement
us: How come that you are still inside CKGR
13:27:45 We had left and came back. There was nobody here, we had all gone and came back.
We left that summer and came back the same winter.
us: Why did you come back?
13:28:55 We never wanted to leave from here.
us: Then why did you move initially?
13:29:22 Because we were pressurisedlforced.





This is our land; we don't know it as a park because we originated here. This is just a
new generation thing. Back in Seretse Khama days we never heard this.
The Government says we went and asked to move which is not true
They were saying we should move from here because it is a place for wild animals
when we did not want to move. That's why we are back; now it is a case we don't
even know who is going to win.
They don't want white people coming here, -initially they had locked the gates , we
went and told people who are representing us, and then they were opened.
us: Where do you get your water from?
13:35:14 initially, the government gave us water then they took everything away.
us: did you have water tanks here or what?
13:36:05 They used to deliver water to us.
us: How do you get your pensions?
13:36:52 We get it outside. Before , they brought the money to us.
us: Where do you get the water from now?
13:37:30 Nowhere, only when it rains. We plough and get watermelons and drink.
67
us: If you are allowed to live here. How do you earn a leaving?
13:38:10 When I am here I don't need a lot of things .
us: Why don 't you want to go and live in a settlement with hospitals, schools and modern
facilities?
13:39:10 I don't want to live in a land that is not mine. Those things, if we want them, they
must bring them to us here .
us: How many people are living in this settlement?
(No answer)
us: Are you allowed to hunt?
13:44:35 No, we are afraid.
us: The same question I asked before to someone, they said that the animals are dangerous for
you.
13:45:06 What do they kill? There is no animal dangerous to us. That's a lie. There are lions
here, they are our pals , when they kill we go to their pray and take the rest of what the
lions kills.
us: Why does not the government see this?
13:45:00 I don 't understand because what you are talking about. I was thought by god, not a
human being.
us: So the government never discussed with you the developments that would occur outside
the park?
13:47:54 They said we were going to find white houses there build for us.
us: So no schools were there
13:48:29
13:49:50
The schools are there but they are theirs not ours.
Before they made schools for us at Xadi and said they were ours , so how did it
happened that they moved them so fast. Again they said the new Xadi area was the
hunting place , and then they turned around started taking people in, beating them , so
who will we believe them.
us: Why does not the government want to talk to us?
13:51:10 Because they are crooks, if you are not careful they will take you down but WE have
realised that know.
us: So you were born here, just like your generations before you?
13:53:00 This is the place , their grave are here.
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us: So where do you kids go to school?
13:53 :57
13:56:27
They go to school in Ganzi , and they live at school. They were taken yesterday.
The only car that comes around here is the car that comes to get the kids when they go
to school, and then if you ask to get a lift they refuse.
69
Appendix 6. The research assistant comment.
Never a chance for a holiday. It felt like this year just stated as last ended. I was really looking
forward for the trip to this part of my country I had never been to before. To see another fellow tribe
which said to be a minority, the Basarwa? Growing up in Botswana I've always thought of them as
an interesting tribe which has still held on to theirs roots, (lifestyles wise), and I feel they are real to
themselves unlike to rest of us in urban areas , who are moving towards western culture as we never
had a culture of our own. I really admire these inhabits of the Kalahari who are said to be the first
people of our country.
The trip began and the excitement accelerated. I had heard a lot about these people, from their life to
the case they are facing now with our government about their eviction. It is a pity I won't see most of
them in Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR) since it is roomed that almost all of them have left
the reserve to go out to our "civilisation".
(Anyway what is civilisation? Is it the infrastructure, alcoholism, westernization?)
Our arrival there passed into the gate and there it was the feeling of being in total wilderness, the
pure beauty of Mother Nature with fresh air and no pollution in any kind. I could not ask for more
and felt proud of being a Botswana and showing such a beauty to foreign visitors. I felt like a true
holiday away from the city and its noise, wow not even network on the phone, what a great get away.
It was almost down when we arrived at the campsite, only to be greeted by a flog of giraffes, what a
beauty! As most of my friends I was not an experienced "camper", here I was , amazed about these
foreigners skills in survival "techniques" and how relaxed they was in the middle of nowhere, among
dangerous animals. The tents and the food were prepared in no time as well as the weather to come.
That night in this open area I was scared the tent was gone flyaway with me inside. The wind was
just something else than home and this time without concrete shelter I felt small, surrounded and
trapped by Mother Nature.
We started in the early morning on the sandy roads with the cars in constantly 4x4, it was an
experience to see and hear a 3 litre engine working on maximum power when necessarily. Deep sand
is just very deep I realised. Before lunchtime we came to the first settlement called Kukama. We
were greeted by the women there who made me wonder where the men was. Politely we greeted and
asked to have a talk with them. What great people just welcome strangers into their homes? The men
had gone for the past few days to get water which to my surprise was not there. They confirmed that
they had water supplies before which the government took away from them as the pressure of the
eviction enwalled.
I was amazed by the simplicity of their lifestyle, and as the conversation dwelled on I was saddened
by their tragic story . They were devastated to hear that they had to move from the only homes they
had ever known and their grandparents ever had. Who would not , but the government is doing it for
their "good course". What good will comes from putting a person through a transition that they never
deemed necessary? Then, the big issue of the truth: From what I gathered these people feel that they
were owed the truth about their eviction, as it is rumoured that that their moved because of the
discovery of diamonds in their land , which the authorities claim is not true .
Mid day, after 3-4 hours driving and 150 km, we suddenly saw 3 vehicles parked and we went and
said hello . It was South African tourists having a lunch break with beers and good food. They really
know how to enjoy themselves. The journey moved on across the reserve to the next settlement and
just around dawn we made a stop after the tiredness of sand which consumes even more hours.
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This was at the heart of the reserve and really the only thing we were looking forward to was a
meal and good sleep as the next campsite was hours away. Just like the first settlement everybody
gave us attention, only this settlement as bigger the previous on, but I could sense reluctance in them
talking to us. Politely we asked them if we could pitch our tents on an open space closer to their
settlement which they flatly refused. And that was quite alarming. The reason for that was that they
were horrified by the thought of wildlife authorities who they claimed sometimes patrols their
settlements and nights and they could get into trouble if they discovered they talked to white people
which apparently was a sin.
Well as far as I knew here in this country we live in a democracy where I am free to do and welcome
whoever I want in my home as long as they are in the country legally and no one will tell me
otherwise, but then there it was the fear in their faces . We sensed that it was not a good idea and we
decided to move on. By then my head was pumping with questions I didn 't have answers to, I was
simply seeing a different side of the country.
The trip to the next campsite took much longer than anticipated as we got lost on the way, and just
before the next settlement in out of darkness there it was, fire light appearing from a distance which
as we approached was a settlement called Molapo. We made stop to ask for directions to the nearest
campsite. This was a different crowd from the last one we met. They were very relaxed and even
gave us someone to take us to the campsite only to find grass as high as me! Where are the facilities
meant for us (not to mention for people living here!)? Our "guide" thought it was quite dangerous to
arrive this late and try to pitch out our tent on this place with all this grass. I was delighted when he
invited us to put up the tent nearby their huts in the settlement. At their place there was no grass or
wilderness! Thank good this people was here! We gladly accepted the invitation.
The next morning, our last day in the reserve we woke up and had a peaceful breakfast on our cadac
stove. Two 4x4 Toyotas there , obviously not in condition to move. We later found out they had
bought them for the compensation money they got from the government. P5000 or about R6000 was
all they got to start a new life outside the reserve. How can you leave your home and living for a
month salary? We were just about to leave them when we went to them to thank for letting us use
their land for the night. We ended up chatting around the fire! We learned that this was the village
where the Bushman spokes person Roy Sesana originated from. During our talk I could not leave the
feeling of unfair treatment; to be told to evacuate the land you ever known , the land that bears the
graves of your grandparents, all for money that less than a monthly salary. One of them actually
commented "if the government want to see transitional change on us, perhaps they must bring the
change to us.just as it is done to all other parts of the country". Another said that this transition also
had to carried out truthfully; "if we are moving for the diamonds be mined here, let it be and lets be
compensated accordingly as it would have been done for any other tribe here in Botswana.
His statement was quite startling as I asked myself if all this was done to these people because they
are considered as undermined and inferior minority somehow. Well most of the Basarwa origin
people are not as illiterate as most Botswana's, thus they felt their rights were being walked upon for
reasons like this. They felt that somehow the other cultures, i.e. those in authorities are not giving the
respect they deserve they believe , they are the first people of Kalahari. Well I don 't know ifit is so,
simply because there are no people of Bushmen in high positions/ranking places who could have
stood up for their rights, or it is so because of their high illiteracy level that the elite can dictate to
them what to do. What I ask myself after this journey in remote, exotic Botswana is if these people
wanted to move from the reserve, why are they back? Was it so that they were forced to leave
because of devastating situations like no water and no pension rights etc. given a situation like this a
person will leave not out of their own will but because of the fear of remaining.
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In that case my country are not speaking the truth to its people, neither the majority nor a group
like this one, all Botswana's. I tend to ask myself were the rights of these people went since it looks
like a sin for them to voice out their opinions. Where is it leading us as the citizens we are around
this fire, seeing deportations of intellectuals (Kenneth.Good), trying to show us a bit of light in this
dark chapter in Botswana's history . Who will remain to question the authorities about their rights
and the Motswana's in generally. Is this Botswana's Zimbabwe?
